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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Title 7 8, Chapter 2a, Section 2(i) of the Utah 
Code Annotated of 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED; 
1. Transacting substantial and continuous business 
activity within the forum state: Whether a resident of England, 
Mr. Mori, who furnished aid to his former wife by helping her 
purchase a home for her exclusive use and by paying child support 
through a Utah bank was "transacting substantial and continuous 
business activity" in Utah thereby, submitting himself to the 
general jurisdiction of the district court? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law 
should not be provided any particular deference and should be 
reviewed for correctness. The court of appeals is free to render 
its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and 
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt, 
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)). 
2. Transacting any business in the State: Whether Mrs. 
Mori's claim to recognize a Japanese divorce decree in Utah arose 
from (1) her former husband's help in purchasing her a home in 
Utah or (2) his payment of child support through a Utah bank; 
thereby, submitting Mr. Mori, a resident of England, to the 
specific personal jurisdiction of the district court pursuant to 
1 
Utah's long-arm statutef Utah Code 1953 section 78-27-24(1)? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law 
should not be provided any particular deference and should be 
reviewed for correctness. The court of appeals is free to render 
its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and 
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt, 
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)). 
3. The ownership, use or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state; Whether Mrs. Mori's claim to recognize a 
Japanese divorce decree in Utah arose from her former husband's 
name being among three other persons as a co-tenant on the deed 
to the title of a home in which Mrs. Mori lives thereby 
submitting her former husband, a resident of England, to the 
specific personal jurisdiction of the district court pursuant to 
Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code 1953 section 78-27-24(4)? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law 
should not be provided any particular deference and should be 
reviewed for correctness. The court of appeals is free to render 
its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and 
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt, 
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)). 
4. Having resided, in the marital relationship, within 
this state: Whether Mrs. Mori's claim to recognize a Japanese 
divorce decree in Utah arose because the parties tarried in Utah 
for the first ten (10) days of their marriage, and visited 
2 
relatives in Utah together two years after their marriage given 
these facts, did Mr. Mori, a resident of England, submit himself 
to the specific personal jurisdiction of the district court by 
having resided in the marital relationship within the state as 
provided by Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
27-24(6)? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law 
should not be provided any particular deference and should be 
reviewed for correctness. The court of appeals is free to render 
its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and 
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt, 
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)). 
5. Permitting alternative service of process and 
enlargements of time: Whether there was insufficient foundation 
to have Mr. Mori, a resident of England, served by alternative 
service and to permit enlargements of time for service of 
process? 
Standard of Review. This writer has attempted to cite a Utah 
case which recites the standard of review for a Rule 4 issue. 
While the reported Utah cases do not specifically provide a 
standard of review, it is believed the proper standard of review 
is that the district court's ruling should be reviewed for 
correctness. (See, Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
3 
This is an appeal from the interlocutory order dated the 
12th of April, 1994. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff filed a complaint in January of 1991. Plaintiff's 
cause of action, or claim, was to recognize a divorce decree 
which was obtained in Tokyo, Japan. Defendant was not served 
within the time limit prescribed by Utah's Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The case was dismissed for lack of prosecution in 
August of 1991. Plaintiff moved on the 28th of September, 1991 
to set aside the district court's Order of Dismissal for failure 
to prosecute. The district court set aside its Order of 
Dismissal. Plaintiff moved for enlargements of time to 
effectuate service of process. 
Defendant is a resident of England. Defendant appeared 
specially to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction. The 
district court denied the challenges to jurisdiction and 
concluded that Mr. Mori, a resident of England, had submitted 
himself to the general jurisdiction of the district court. The 
district court went on to find that the court could find that Mr. 
Mori had submitted himself to specific personal jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute. Defendant Mr. Mori appeals 
the district court's interlocutory order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married in Utah on April 23, 1983. 
Record at 201. 
2. The parties left Utah on May 3, 19 83 to live in New 
York to attend graduate school. Record at 194 and 219. 
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3. In 1985, Mrs. Mori went to Utah to stay with Mr. Mori's 
parents before the parties moved to Japan. Record at 194. 
4. Mr. Mori joined his wife in Utah for three days prior 
to leaving for Japan. Record at 219. 
5. One child was conceived and born to the parties while 
they lived in Japan. Record at 219. 
6. The parties were divorced by order of the Tokyo Family 
Court on June 1, 1987. Record at 17 8. 
7. After the divorce, Mrs. Mori moved to Utah to live in 
the house Mr. Mori helped purchase for her. Record at 218. 
8* Mr. Mori moved from Tokyof Japan to England. Record at 
193. 
9. Mr. Mori maintains a joint bank account with his father 
in Utah through which he pays support to Mrs. Mori. Record at 
360. 
10. Mrs. Mori filed the Complaint of this matter, on or 
about the 9th day of January, 1991, requesting Utah to adopt the 
Japanese divorce decree. The following procedural events 
occurred: 
9 January 
9 January 
9 January 
1991 
1991 
1991 
17 January 1991 
Complaint filed. (Record at 
2). 
Affidavit of Brian Harrison to 
support service of process by 
mail. (Record at 6). 
Order to Attach Divorce Decree 
and Allow Service of Process 
by Mail under Rule 4(f)(3). 
(Record at 4). 
Proof of Mailing to London, 
England but no return receipt 
ever received. (Record at 
11 July 1991 
19 August 1991 
28 September 1991 
24 October 1991 
17 December 1992 
17 December 1992 
17 December 1992 
27 January 1993 
18). Plaintiff's counsel 
originally filed an inquiry 
about the mailing but then 
later advised the court that 
he did not want to continue 
the inquiry. (Note on record 
January 13, 1992 (Record at 
32)). 
Order to Show Cause why the 
case should not be dismissed 
for failure to prosecute under 
Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
(Record at 20). 
Order of Dismissal for failure 
to prosecute under Rule 4-103 
of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration because neither 
party appeared to contest the 
dismissal at the hearing for 
the order to show cause. 
(Record at 21). 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set 
Aside Order of Dismissal. 
(Record at 25). 
Order to set aside dismissal 
of the 19th of August, 1991 
entered. (Record at 27). 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge 
Time for service of summons. 
(Record at 36). 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities 
supporting Motion to Enlarge 
Time for service of summons. 
(Record at 39). 
Affidavit of Brian Harrison in 
support of Motion to Enlarge 
Time for service of summons. 
(Record at 42). 
Ruling which granted 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge 
Time for service of summons to 
April 1, 1993. (Record at 44). 
15 April 1993 Plaintiff's second Motion to 
Enlarge Time for service of 
summons. (Record at 61). 
21 April 1993 Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities 
requesting that Plaintiff be 
allowed to serve Defendant at 
his office by serving his 
secretary or receptionist or 
his wife. (Record at 65). 
22 April 1993 Order permitting Plaintiff to 
Enlarge Time for service of 
summons to 21 July 1993 and to 
serve summons on Defendant's 
secretary, receptionist or 
wife. (Record at 70). 
12. On the 21st day of May, 1993r Mr. Mori's counsel made a 
special appearance for the sole purpose to question the 
jurisdiction of the court and to quash service of process. 
(Record at 78). 
13. On the 18th of June, 1993, Defendant made a special 
appearance for the purpose to challenge the personal jurisdiction 
of the court and to strike plaintiff's counsel's affidavit to 
support service by alternative means. (Record at 111). 
14. On the 9th of September 1993, the court denied 
defendant's challenge to the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
and accepted service of process as sufficient to satisfy Rule 4 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure despite the procedural 
events outlined in No. 11. (Record at 181). 
15. On the 24th of September, 1993. Plaintiff specially 
appeared to challenge the district court's jurisdiction to adopt 
the Tokyo divorce decree. (Record at 184). 
16. In a Memorandum Decision dated February 16, 1994, the 
trial court denied Mr. Mori's challenge to the court's 
jurisdiction. The court found that Mr. Mori, a resident of 
Englandf had submitted himself to the general personal 
jurisdiction of the district court. (Record at 243). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal requires the understanding of the following two 
concepts: 
(1) General personal jurisdiction. This is a concept where 
a nonresident defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of 
the forum because the nonresident has conducted "substantial and 
continuous" activity in the forum. If the nonresident 
defendant's activities arise to this level, a state court may 
exercise personal jurisdiction in actions related or unrelated to 
these substantial and continuous local activities. 
(2) Specific personal jurisdiction. This is a concept where 
the nonresident defendant submits himself to the personal 
jurisdiction of the forum because plaintiff's claim or cause of 
action, arose from the acts of the nonresident which are 
enumerated in the state's long-arm statute. 
General personal jurisdiction may not be exercised over Mr. 
Mori, a resident of Englandf because the contacts he has with the 
State of Utah do not rise to the standards of due process as 
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. Mori's contacts with 
this state are not continuous, systematic or substantial. 
Specific personal jurisdiction over Mr. Mori, a resident of 
England, may not be exercised pursuant to any provision of Utah's 
8 
long-arm statute in an action brought by his former wife to have 
the Utah court register a Tokyo, Japan divorce decree because the 
claim, or cause of actionf did not "arise from" any of the 
activities enumerated in Utah's long-arm statute. 
The district court did not have personal jurisdiction over 
Mr. Mori pursuant to Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure because the 
necessary foundation was not established to permit alternative 
service of process or enlargement of time for service of process. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
There exists fundamental principles to which adherence is 
required in order to maintain the viability of the legal system's 
structure. Due process is the cornerstone of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. Upon the principle of due process rests the 
proper exercise of the court's jurisdiction. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution requires that a state have personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant before an action can be maintained. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the circumstances under 
which a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant. Beginning with International Shoe v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court has 
provided, as a prerequisite to a civil action, there must be 
certain "minimum contacts" with the forum before the court may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. 
The State of Utah has imposed limits on the exercise of personal 
9 
jurisdiction over nonresidents. First, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution resounds the proclamation made in the U.S. 
Constitution that an individual will not be deprived of due 
process of law. (Utah Const. Art 1 § 7 (1896)). Second, the Utah 
State Legislature has enacted the long-arm statute which governs 
the state court's authority to exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. (Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-24). In so far as nonresident defendants are concerned, 
assertions of specific personal jurisdiction must satisfy the 
provisions of Utah's long-arm statute and comport with due 
process. 
The case of Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 
850 (Utah 1978)f is helpful in distinguishing between general and 
specific personal jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court said at 
page 853 footnote 6: 
General personal jurisdiction is the concept 
reflected in a doing business statute, which requires 
substantial and continuous local activity; specific 
jurisdiction is the concept applicable to a long-arm 
statute, which requires only minimum local contacts . . 
. Where a defendant's forum-state activity is 
extensive, the forum may assert personal jurisdiction 
on either related or unrelated claims (doing business 
concept). Where the defendant has only minimum 
contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may be 
asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's 
forum-state activity (long-arm or 'transaction of 
business concept'). 
(Underlined added; Italics original). 
The federal district court of Utah has outlined a three-step 
analysis for determining the existence of specific personal 
jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute. In Romney v. St. 
John Virgin Grand Villas Assoc, 734 F.S. 957 (D. Utah 1990), the 
10 
court set forth the process for a state court to follow in order 
to acquire specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm 
statute. The court said at pages 959-60: 
The first step is to determine whether the facts 
meet one of the statute's specifically enumerated acts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1987) reads in part . . . . 
The second step is to determine whether the 
"plaintiff's claim arises out of the defendant's 
performance of one of the statute's specifically 
enumerated acts." (cite omitted). 
The third step is to "determine whether the 
assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with federal 
due process limitations." (cite omitted). "[T]he 
constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether 
an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due 
process remains whether the defendant purposefully 
established 'minimum contacts' in the forum state." 
(cites omitted). 
(Emphasis added). 
The following arguments address the findings and conclusions 
reached by the district court in the present case. The arguments 
point out why the court neither has general personal jurisdiction 
nor specific personal jurisdiction. And why there was 
insufficient foundation to permit alternative service of process 
and enlargement of time for service of process. 
POINT I. 
TRANSACTING SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUOUS BUSINESS ACTIVITY WITHIN 
THE FORUM STATE: MR. MORI, A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, WHO FURNISHED 
AID TO HIS FORMER WIFE BY HELPING HER PURCHASE A HOME FOR HER 
EXCLUSIVE USE AND WHO PAID CHILD SUPPORT THROUGH A UTAH BANK WAS 
NOT "TRANSACTING SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUOUS BUSINESS ACTIVITY" IN 
UTAH AND THEREFORE DID NOT SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE GENERAL 
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
A. Mr. Mori's aid to his former wife to help her purchase a 
home for her exclusive use is not substantial and continuous 
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local activity and therefore, does not give the court general 
personal jurisdiction in an action to recognize a divorce decree 
adjudicated in a foreign nation. 
The district court concluded that Mr* Mori submitted himself 
to the jurisdiction of the court. The district court 
specifically found that it could exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over Mr. Mori. The district court went on to find 
that it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Mr. 
Mori because he helped Mrs. Morif after the divorce, purchase a 
home in Orem, Utah for her exclusive use. The district court 
said at page 8 with regard to specific personal jurisdiction by 
saying: 
Even if the Court could not find general personal 
jurisdiction the Court could find specific personal 
jurisdiction [pursuant to the long-arm statute] on the 
claim of the Plaintiff as it relates to the ownership 
of the Orem home as this arises out of a particular 
activity of the Defendant in the [S]tate of Utah. 
(Emphasis added). 
The doctrine of general personal jurisdiction requires that 
a nonresident defendant to have contacts with the forum state "so 
substantial and of such a nature" that the state may assert 
jurisdiction over the nonresident where the claim being asserted 
is unrelated to any of the acts enumerated in the long-arm 
statute. (See, International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
318 (1945)). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the degree 
of contacts with the forum must be "continuous and systematic" to 
justify the assertion of general personal jurisdiction over 
unrelated causes of action. (Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). Thus, general 
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personal jurisdiction could be labeled as a dispute blind. 
In Helicopteros Nacionales, the plaintiff filed a wrongful 
death claim in Texas state court. The claim arose when a 
helicopter crash in Peru causing the deaths of American employees 
of a Texas-based joint venture. The Texas court based its 
exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant because 
(1) the defendant had negotiated the joint venture with plaintiff 
in Texas; (2) defendant, over a period of eight months, had 
purchased 80% of its helicopters and a substantial quantity of 
spare parts out of Texas; (3) defendant sent its pilots for 
training in Texas; (4) defendant sent technicians to Texas for 
consultations; (5) defendant accepted checks which were drafted 
on a Texas bank. (Id. at 410-11). But, nevertheless, the U.S. 
Supreme court held that the defendant's contacts with the state 
were not continuous and systematic and therefore, the state court 
could not assert general personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant. (See, Helicopteros Nacionales in 
Appendix). 
The district court in the present case found that it could 
exercise general personal jurisdiction. The activities which the 
court relied upon for the exercise of general personal 
jurisdiction were that (1) Mr. Mori's aided his former spouse in 
purchasing a home for her use after the divorce and (2) he 
maintained a joint checking account through which child support 
was paid. These activities are minor when compared with the 
activities carried on by Helico in Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A.. The activities by Helico were considerably more 
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substantial and continuous when compared to Mr. Mori's minimal 
activities. 
B. Mr. Mori, a resident of England, did not submit himself to 
the general personal jurisdiction of the district court by 
maintaining a checking account at a Utah bank through which child 
support was paid because maintaining a checking does not 
constitute substantial and continuous local activity. 
The district court concluded that the exercise of general 
personal jurisdiction was proper because the "[d]efendant is 
conducting substantial and continuous activity in the state of 
Utah." (Record at 357). The district court based its conclusion 
on the fact that Mr. Mori helped purchase a home for his ex-wife 
in Orem, Utah and that Mr. Mori was an alternate signor on a 
checking account in a Utah bank from which child support was 
paid. (Record at 358). 
In Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 
1120 (Utah 1992) , the court explained at page 1122: 
General personal jurisdiction permits a court to 
exercise power over a Defendant without regard to the 
subject of the claim asserted. For such jurisdiction 
to exist, the Defendant must be conducting substantial 
and continuous local activity in the forum state. In 
contrast, specific personal jurisdiction gives a court 
power over a Defendant only with respect to claims 
arising out of the particular activities of the 
Defendant in the forum state. 
(Emphasis added). 
Helping a former wife purchase a home for her exclusive use 
after the divorce and maintaining a joint checking account with a 
third party are not substantial and continuous local activity 
and, thereforef insufficient to support the exercise of general 
personal jurisdiction over a resident of England. 
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C. Mrs. Mori's intention to move from Tokyo, Japan to reside in 
Orem, Utah did not submit Mr. Mori, a resident of England, to the 
general personal jurisdiction of the district court because her 
activities or intentions cannot submit him to the jurisdiction. 
The district court relied upon the fact the parties 
anticipated, at the time of the divorce decree, that Mrs. Mori 
would move from Japan and reside in Utah after the divorce. The 
district court said: 
The Japan Divorce Decree contemplates the Plaintiff and 
the child of the parties would live in the [S]tate of 
Utah. 
(Record at 359). 
The future domicile of a former spouse has no bearing upon 
conferring general personal jurisdiction over the other spouse. 
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Kulko v. Superior Court of 
California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), is helpful in determining how a 
change of residence of a former wife effects her former husband. 
In Kulko, the marital domicile of the parties was in the State of 
New York. Mr. and Mrs. Kulko were divorced in Haiti. After the 
divorce, Mrs. Kulko moved to California. Under the separation 
agreement signed in New York, their daughter lived with Mr. Kulko 
in New York. A short time later, the daughter asked her father 
if he would consent to her living in California with her mother. 
Mr. Kulko consented to her move. 
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the former wife's move 
from New York to California and the husband's acquiescence in his 
daughter's request to live in California with her mother was not 
an act which would put a reasonable person on notice that he 
might be haled before a California court. (Id. at 94 and 
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appendix). 
Foreseeability alone is constitutionally insufficient to 
establish a benchmark for personal jurisdiction. In Worldwide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980), the U.S. 
Supreme Court reviewed its prior decisions in which 
foreseeability was an insufficient support for personal 
jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court said at page 566: 
In Hanson v. Denckla, [357 U.S. 235 (1958)], it was no 
doubt foreseeable that the settlor of a Delaware trust 
would subsequently move to Florida and seek to exercise 
a power of appointment there; yet we held that Florida 
courts could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction 
over a Delaware trustee that had no other contacts with 
the forum State. In Kulko v. California Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 98 (1978)f the U.S. Supreme Court 
pointed out that it was foreseeable that a divorced 
wife would move to California from New York, the 
domicile of the marriage, and that a minor daughter 
would live with the mother. However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that California could not exercise 
jurisdiction in a child support action over the former 
husband who had remained in New York. 
At the end of the parties' marriage, Mrs. Mori decided to 
return to live in the United States. She decided to make Orem, 
Utah the situs of her new home. Although the Tokyo Japan divorce 
decree contemplated her move to Utah, her move was a unilateral 
activity. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the question of 
what effect one's party's unilateral activity might have on 
another party with respect to the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. 
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1873 
(1984), the state court attempted to stretch the principles of 
due process by basing, in part, its exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant because the nonresident defendant 
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had accepted checks drawn on state bank in its business 
negotiations with the plaintiff. The U.S. Supreme Court, 
rejecting the finding of the district court, said: 
[U]nilateral activity of another party or a third 
person is not an appropriate consideration when 
determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts 
with a forum state to justify an assertion of 
jurisdiction. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 
436 U.S. 84, 93 (arbitrary to subject one parent to 
suit in any State where other parent chooses to spend 
time while having custody of child pursuant to 
separation agreement). 
(Underlined added; Italics original). 
Mr. Mori had not submitted himself to the general personal 
jurisdiction of the district court. Any of Mrs. Mori's 
intentions or unilateral activities cannot support the exercise 
of general personal jurisdiction over Mr. Mori. 
POINT II. 
TRANSACTING ANY BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE; MRS. MORI'S CLAIM TO 
RECOGNIZE A JAPANESE DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH DID NOT ARISE FROM 
(1) HER FORMER HUSBAND'S AID IN HELPING HER PURCHASING A HOME IN 
UTAH OR (2) HIS PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT THROUGH A UTAH BANK AND 
THEREFORE, HER FORMER SPOUSEf A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, DID NOT 
SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT PURSUANT TO UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE 
1953 SECTION 78-27-24(1). 
In the present case, the district court said at page 7 of 
the Amended Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions at Law: 
78-27-24 [Utah Code Annotated] "Any person, 
not withstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
court of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transacting of any business within this 
S L a L c , . . . 
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It is clear the Defendant has transacted business 
in the state of Utah subsequent to the marriage of the 
parties. The Defendant either personally or through an 
agent contracted to purchase a home in Orem, Utah. The 
Defendant personally or through his agent makes the 
monthly payments on the home in Utah. The Defendant 
sends monthly child support payments to the Plaintiff 
by way of checks drawn on Zions Bank of Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The Plaintiff and the child of the parties live 
in the home purchased by the parties during the course 
of their marriage. 
(Record at 359). 
Subsection (1) of Section 78-27-24 applies to cases arising 
from the "transaction of any business within this State." This 
section of the long-arm statute may allow the exercise of 
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the specific 
claim, or cause of action, is directly related to the nonresident 
defendant's activity. The case of Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 
610 P,2d 1307 (Utah 1980), is helpful in determining what 
activities give rise to the exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 
In Roskelley, plaintiff brought an action against a 
nonresident alleging breach of a contract to pay commission fees 
to plaintiff for its services in connection with the sale of 
goods by defendant for use in Utah. The Supreme Court held that 
Utah courts could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant where defendant's purposeful 
activities within the State consisted of the sale of equipment 
which was installed in Utah and defendant's visits to Utah for 
the purpose of overseeing the installation because the 
plaintiff's cause of action was not closely related to 
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defendant's activities in Utah. The Supreme Court was not 
convinced that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with 
the requirements of due process owed the nonresident defendant 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 
1313). 
In the present case, the district court, after finding it 
had general jurisdictionf went on to find that even if general 
jurisdiction was unobtainable, the court could exercise specific 
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Mori. (Record at 358). The 
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction is not blind to 
plaintiff's claim or cause of action. Specific personal 
jurisdiction may only be properly exercised if the claimf or 
cause of actionf arises from the specific enumerated activity of 
the nonresident defendant. Mr. Mori's aid to his wife in 
purchasing a home and his status of alternate signor on a 
checking account through which he pays child support do not 
arises from, nor are these activities directly related tof Mrs. 
Mori's compliant which solely prays for the recognition of the 
Japanese divorce decree. Without a direct relationship between 
the claim and the activities, Mr. Mori has not submitted himself 
to the specific personal jurisdiction of the district court. 
POINT III. 
THE OWNERSHIP, USE OR POSSESSION OF ANY REAL ESTATE SITUATED IN 
THIS STATE; MRS. MORI'S CLAIM TO RECOGNIZE A JAPANESE DIVORCE 
DECREE IN UTAH DID NOT ARISE FROM HER FORMER HUSBAND'S NAME BEING 
AMONG THREE OTHER PERSONS AS A CO-TENANT ON THE DEED TO THE TITLE 
OF A HOME IN WHICH MRS. MORI LIVES AND THEREFORE, HER FORMER 
HUSBAND, A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, DID NOT SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE 
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT PURSUANT TO 
UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE 1953 SECTION 78-27-24(4). 
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A, Mrs, Mori's action to recognize a Japanese divorce decree 
does not arise from Mr, Mori's interest in real property and 
therefore, Mr, Mori did not submit himself specific personal 
jurisdiction of the district court. 
The district court found that Mr. Mori was subject to 
specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute 
because he has an interest in real estate located in Orem, Utah. 
(Record at 357). Whether Mr. Mori has an interest in real estate 
in Orem, Utah is only one prong of the analysis in determining 
the proper exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. 
The district court confused two concepts: specific personal 
jurisdiction and an alleged breach of a contract made in a 
foreign country. The district court said: 
The Court finds the Defendant is conducting substantial 
and continuous activity in the [S]tate of Utah. Even 
if the Court could not find general personal 
jurisdiction[,] the Court could find specific personal 
jurisdiction on the claim of Plaintiff as it relates to 
the ownership of the Orem home as this arises out of a 
particular activity of the Defendant in the [S]tate of 
Utah. (Record at 358). 
Plaintiff's complaint seeks no relief for breach of contract 
regarding the Orem home. Plaintiff's cause of action, or claim, 
is to adopt the Tokyo Japan divorce decree in Utah. There are no 
other claims, express or implied, in plaintiff's complaint. The 
sole claim and prayer in plaintiff's complaint is as follows: 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the [Tokyo Japan] 
divorce decree be registered in the above-entitled 
Court. (Complaint at 2). 
How did Mr. Mori, a resident of England, submit himself to 
the specific personal jurisdiction of the district court because 
the parties allegedly agreed in Tokyo that Mr. Mori would help 
his former wife purchase real estate in Utah? The district court 
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failed to recognize the distinction between the exercise of 
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in an action to 
recognize a foreign-nation divorce decree and the exercise of in 
rem jurisdiction over a nonresident in an action to quiet title 
to real estate. 
The case of Willis v. Willis, 655 F.2d 1333 (D.C. 1981), is 
helpful in dealing with the question of unrelated claims and the 
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. In Willis, defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff objected to defendant's Motion to Dismiss by arguing 
that defendant had an interest in real property in the forum 
state and that defendant had paid notes secured by deeds of trust 
on that property in the forum state. (Id. at 1337). The 
appellate court decided that the district court erroneously 
determined that the defendant's interest in real estate in the 
forum provided a sufficient basis to assert personal jurisdiction 
to all the plaintiff's claims notwithstanding all of the 
plaintiff's claims were not related to that real estate. (Id. at 
1336). The appellate court said at page 1336: 
Section 13-423(b) of the District of Columbia long arm 
statute provides that "[w]hen jurisdiction over a 
person is based solely upon this [long arm] section, 
only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in 
this section may be asserted against him." The 
District of Columbia courts have interpreted section 
13-423(b) as a bar to claims unrelated to the acts 
forming a basis for personal jurisdiction. (cites 
omitted). Because [plaintiff]'s remaining claims 
against [the defendant] neither derived from nor are 
connected with [the defendant]'s interest in the real 
estate, we find that the District erred in relying on 
the real estate as a basis for asserting in personam 
jurisdiction over Tthe defendant] with respect to the 
other unrelated claims. 
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(Emphasis added). 
Mrs. Mori's claim to adopt the Tokyo Japan divorce decree in 
Utah is unrelated to the fact that Mr. Mori has an interest in 
real estate in Utah. The district court's reliance on the fact 
that he has an interest in real estate to assert specific 
personal jurisdiction was misplaced. 
B. Plaintiff ought not be permitted to "bootstrap" claims. 
Section 78-27-24 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, provides a limited number of circumstances when the 
court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident. This section 
of the Utah Code provides in material part: 
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident 
of this state . . . does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself . . . to the 
jurisdiction of the court of this state as to any claim 
arising from [one or more of the enumerated acts]. 
(Emphasis added). 
There is an attempt in this case to use the facts that (1) 
Mr. Mori has an interest in real estate in Utah and (2) is an 
alternate signor on a joint checking account through which child 
support is paid to conclude that Mr. Mori has submitted himself 
to specific personal jurisdiction of the district court. This 
attempt fails because it tries to bootstrap claims which are not 
impliedly or expressly a part of this action. Those facts are 
unrelated to this cause of action, which is to recognize a 
Japanese divorce decree in Utah, and cannot be bootstrapped in 
order to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. 
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The case of Baldwin v. Easterlinq, 754 P.2d 942 (Utah 1988)f 
is helping in dealing with a case where the plaintiff attempted 
to bootstrap unrelated claims. The plaintiff mother in Baldwin 
brought an action for paternity and breach of promise to marry 
against a nonresidentf putative father. The Supreme Court of 
Utah rejected the bootstrapping of claims. The Utah Supreme 
Court said at page 945: 
Section 7 8-27-24 [Utah's long arm statute] provides 
that a nonresident submits himself to the jurisdiction 
of the Utah courts "as to any claim arising from" the 
acts there enumerated. [Plaintiff]'s claim does not 
"arise from" any misrepresentation regarding payment of 
return air fare, (cites omitted). fSIhe cannot 
bootstrap onto any claim for misrepresentation her 
separate and distinct statutory paternity action. 
Jurisdiction over a nonresident for one claim of a 
plaintiff does not generally confer jurisdiction over 
the nonresident for other claims that plaintiff may 
have. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the district court concluded that 
specific personal jurisdiction could be found "on the claim of 
the Plaintiff as it relates to the ownership of the Orem home as 
this arises out of a particular activity of the Defendant in the 
state of Utah." (Record at 358). However, this conclusion is not 
consistent with Baldwin. 
POINT IV. 
HAVING RESIDED, IN THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP, WITHIN THIS STATE; 
MRS. MORI'S CLAIM TO RECOGNIZE A JAPANESE DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH 
DID NOT ARISE BECAUSE THE PARTIES TARRIED IN UTAH FOR THE FIRST 
TEN (10) DAYS OF THEIR MARRIAGE, AND VISITED RELATIVES IN UTAH 
TOGETHER TWO YEARS AFTER THEIR MARRIAGE. GIVEN THESE FACTS, MR. 
MORI, A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, DID NOT SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE 
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT PURSUANT TO 
UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-27-24(6). 
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A. Mr. and Mrs. Mori visits to Utah as a married couple do not 
rise to the level of "having resided" as required by Utah's long-
arm statute (78-27-24(6)). 
Utah's long-arm statute provides that any person who, in 
person or through an agent, does any of seven enumerated acts 
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah as to 
any claim arising from those enumerated acts. (Utah Code Ann. 78-
27-24). Subsection 6 of Utah's long-arm statute provides in 
material part: 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the 
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding 
subsequent departure from the state . . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
The district court erroneously concluded that Mr. Mori had 
"resided" in Utah while in the marital relationship. (Record at 
357). The court based this conclusion on the following: 
This Court finds is [it] [sic] has jurisdiction 
over the Defendant under [sub]section (6) as follows: 
a. The parties were married in Utah; 
b. Defendant was a resident of Utah for all 
purposes up to and beyond his marriage date; 
c. Utah was not merely a convenient place for 
marriage; 
d. The terms of the divorce decree contemplate 
the return to Utah; 
e. Defendant has visitation rights in Utah; 
f. Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who 
have visitation rights; 
g. The Court cannot locate any case law which 
puts a time limit on how long the parties must reside 
within the state following marriage. 
(Record at 356-357). 
The above-cited seven findings do not provide a sufficient 
basis for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Mr. 
Mori pursuant to the long-arm statute. Furthermore, when stated 
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in their proper context, several of the above-cited findings lack 
foundation to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
a nonresident. 
B. The marriage of the parties in Utah is insufficient to 
support personal jurisdiction over Mr. Morir a resident of 
England. 
Prior to the marriage of the parties, Mr. Mori had been 
accepted into graduate school in New York. The parties 
contemplated and decided that immediately after their marriage, 
they would leave Utah and establish domicile and residency in the 
State of New York. (Affidavit of Gordon Wayne Mori, October 15, 
1993 f 2). The U.S. Supreme Court case of Kulko v. California 
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1977), is once again helpful in 
determining the applicable effect, if any, of the marriage of Mr. 
and Mrs. Mori in Utah. The U.S. Supreme Court said at page 93: 
Appellant [Mr. Kulko] has been in California on only 
two occasion, once in 1959 for a three-day military 
stopover on his way to Korea . . . and again in 1960 
for a 24-hour stopover on his return from Korean 
service. To hold such temporary visits to a State a 
basis for the assertion in in personam jurisdiction 
over unrelated actions arising in the future would make 
a mockery of the limitations on state jurisdiction 
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . where two New 
York domiciliaries, for reasons of convenience, marry 
in the State of California and thereafter spend their 
entire married life in New York, the fact of their 
California marriage by itself cannot support a 
California court's exercise of jurisdiction over a 
spouse who remains a New York resident in an action 
relating to child support. 
(Underlined added; Italics original). 
The Utah long-arm statute reflects the reasoning of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, listing activities from which the participant 
might anticipate being "haled before a court." (Kulko v. 
25 
California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1977)(quoting Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1976)). In the present case, the 
district court found that the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Mori in 
Utah was not merely a place of convenience. 
It appears that the district court was straining to bring 
Mr. Mori before the courts of Utah. At the time of their 
marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Mori did not intend to reside in Utah. 
They spent their entire married life residing outside of the 
State of Utah having lived in New York and Tokyo, Japan. The 
parties could have planned the marriage party in New York because 
it was their intention to make New York, not Utah, their 
domicile. However, a wedding in New York may have been an 
inconvenience to their Utah family members. Utah was only a 
convenient place to hold a wedding before moving to New York. 
Subsection (6) might apply if Mr. and Mrs. Mori had resided 
in Utah in the marital relationship. The proper definition of 
the term "reside" has been at issue in several Utah cases. Many 
of these case have relied on the definition of "reside" in the 
voting statutes. For example, in Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978), the plaintiff's personal injury claim 
turned on a question of residency and domicile of the plaintiff. 
The court's analysis relied, in part, upon on the voting statutes 
of Utah. (Id. at 615). The court in K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 
588 (Utah App. 1988), turned to the voting statutes of Utah for 
assistance in resolving a residency issue as it pertained to an 
adoption. (Id. at 591). 
Utah's voting statute is helpful in defining the term 
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"resides." (See, Utah Code Ann. § 20-2-14). This section 
provides in material part: 
A person 'resides' within the state if he has his 
principal place of residence within the state and has a 
present intention to continue residency within the 
state permanently or indefinitely . . . ." 
Another helpful insight into the definition of "resides" as 
it applies to a divorce action is found in Haddow v. Haddow, 7 07 
P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
standard for terminating alimony if "the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex." (Id. at 672 
(referring to section 30-3-5(3) of the Utah Code Annotated). The 
Utah Supreme Court said at page 672: 
This Court has already said that the residency 
contemplate by the statute is more than temporary stay, 
(cite omitted). 
* * * 
[CJommon residency means the sharing of a common 
abode that both parties consider their principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of 
time. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Haddow court relied on Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 
1387 (Utah 1980), in which the court used the dictionary to 
derive a definition of "reside." The court found that "reside" 
means "[t]o dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a 
settled abode for a time." (quoting Webster's New Twentieth 
Century Dictionary, 2d ed.). The court in Knuteson went on to 
specifically hold that a stay of two months and ten days did not 
qualify as "residing." (Id. at 1389). 
When Mr. and Mrs. Mori wed, they did not intend or 
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contemplate making Utah their home. The days they spent in Utah 
just after their marriage do not qualify as "having resided in 
the marital relationship." Nor does their 10-day stay or their 
visits to Utah qualify as "residing" under Utah's case law and 
statutes. (See, Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), 
Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980), Utah Code Ann. § 
20-2-14) . 
The district court found that it had personal jurisdiction 
over Mr. Mori because the "terms of the [Tokyo, Japan] divorce 
decree contemplate the return [of Mrs. Mori] to Utah." (Record at 
357). The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed this issue in 
Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, Hanson v. Denckla and Kulko v. 
California Superior Court. The U.S. Supreme Court summed its 
opinion on this issue at page 566 of the Worldwide Volkswagen 
opinion by saying: 
In Hanson v. Denckla, [357 U.S. 235 (1958)], it was no 
doubt foreseeable that the settlor of a Delaware trust 
would subseguently move to Florida and seek to exercise 
a power of appointment there; yet we held that Florida 
courts could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction 
over a Delaware trustee that had no other contacts with 
the forum State. In Kulko v. California Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 98 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court 
pointed out that it was foreseeable that a divorced 
wife would move to California from New York, the 
domicile of the marriage, and that a minor daughter 
would live with the mother. However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that California could not exercise 
jurisdiction in a child support action over the former 
husband who had remained in New York. 
(Emphasis added). 
The fact the Tokyo Family Court foresaw that Mrs. Mori would 
move to Utah following the divorce ought not be viewed as Mr. 
Mori's submission to specific or general personal jurisdiction. 
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Mr. Mori moved directly from Japan to reside in England after the 
divorce. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the argument that 
the foreseeability of a subsequent move by a potential plaintiff 
will confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 
(Idk). 
C. The locus of visitation rights are insufficient grounds on 
which to basis the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has denounced the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent based upon the 
custodial parent's residence. In Kulko, the U.S. Supreme Court 
said at pages 101: 
We therefore believe that the state courts in the 
instant case failed to heed our admonition that 'the 
flexible standard of International Shoe does not 
'herald the eventual demise of all restrictions on the 
personal jurisdiction of state courts.' (cites omitted) 
[W]e commented on the extension of in personam 
jurisdiction under evolving standards of due process, 
explaining that this trend was in large part 
'attributable to the . . . increasing nationalization 
of commerce . . . accompanied by modern transportation 
and communication that have made it much less 
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a 
State where he engages in economic activity, (cite 
omitted). But the mere act of sending a child to 
California to live with her mother is not a commercial 
act and connotes no intent to obtain or expectancy of 
receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that 
would make fair the assertion of that State's judicial 
jurisdiction. 
(Underlined added; Italics original). 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Worldwide Volkswagen, addressing 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant said at page 297: 
The nonresident's contacts must be such that he should 
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"reasonably anticipate being hauled into court" in this 
state* 
(Emphasis added). 
Mrs. Mori's residence in the State of Utah is insufficient 
as a basis for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction 
over her former husband. The U.S. Supreme Courtf in Hanson v. 
Denckla at page 253, said: 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot 
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum 
State. 
(Emphasis added). 
To hold that visitation rights can serve as a basis for 
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident would mean that 
Mr. Mori would be amenable to suit wherever his former wife 
happens to be residing. Thus, the residence of the former wife, 
and not the defendant purposeful contacts with the state, would 
determine our court's jurisdiction. For a state court to 
exercise specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to the long-arm 
statute merely because the mother is residing there may 
discourage parents from entering into reasonable visitation 
agreements. (See, Kulko). 
The district court also based its exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Mr. Mori, a nonresident, on the fact that Mr. 
Mori's parents, who are residents of Utah, have visitation rights 
in Utah. The court said, with respect to the grandparent's 
visitation rights, at pages 9 and 10 of the Amended Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions at Law: 
This Court finds is (sic) has jurisdiction over 
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the Defendant under [sub]section (6) [of Utah's long-
arm statute] as follows: 
* * * 
f. Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who 
have visitation rights; 
(Emphasis added)(Record at 356-357), 
Utah's strong interest in protecting the welfare of its 
resident children, standing alone, cannot support a finding of 
specific personal jurisdiction. No matter how emotional the 
arguments for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant may be, the court ought not exercise 
personal jurisdiction where it simply does not exist. The fact 
that a nonresident's parents are residents of Utah cannot confer 
personal jurisdiction over that nonresident. Nor does the fact 
that a nonresident's parents have visitations rights in the State 
provide any basis for the exercise of general personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident. 
POINT V. 
PERMITTING ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS AND ENLARGEMENTS OF 
TIME: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO HAVE MR. MORI, A 
RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, SERVED BY ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS OR 
TO PERMIT ENLARGEMENTS OF TIME FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS. 
A. There was insufficient foundation to permit alternative 
service of process. 
Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
material part: 
Where the identity of whereabouts of the person to 
be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through 
reasonable diligence where service upon all of the 
individual parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to 
believe that the person to be served is avoiding 
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service of process, the party seeking service of 
process may file a motion supported by affidavit 
requesting an order allowing service by publication, by 
mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit 
shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or 
serve the party to be served, or the circumstances 
which make it impracticable to serve all of the 
individual parties . . . . 
Through the affidavit of Brian Harrison, counsel for the 
plaintiff, foundation for alternative service was attempted. 
However, the affidavit was fatally flawed. Brian Harrison did 
not have first-hand knowledge of any service attempts which were 
alleged in his affidavit. There is no indication or 
certification that Brian C. Harrison was the individual making 
any attempts to serve process on defendant. Significantly, there 
does not appear to be any affidavits by anyone who has attempted 
to locate and serve Mr. Mori showing "efforts made to identify, 
locate or serve the party to be served" as mandated by Rule 4(g) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the record does 
not show efforts made and that reasonable diligence was exercised 
to serve Mr. Mori properly in England. 
In Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538 
(Utah 1973), the court said at page 542: 
[A]n affidavit must be made on personal knowledge of 
the affiant, and set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Statements made merely on information and belief will 
be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion testimony that 
would not be admissible if testified to at trial may 
not properly be set forth in an affidavit. 
(Emphasis added). 
Hustace v. Kapuni, 718 P.2d 1109 (HI App. 1986) is also 
helpful. In Hustace, the court, in discussing the requirements 
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of obtaining an order to service the defendant by means other 
than personal service, emphasized at page 1116 that: 
Affidavits should specify the sources the affiant 
consulted in his efforts to locate and effect personal 
service on the defendant or defendants. The adverse 
claimant should not be allowed to rely on a bald 
statement that diligent inquiry was made . . • 
Protection against violation of due process requires 
vigilance against defective notice. Strict adherence 
to statute is mandatory. 
(Emphasis added). 
The affidavit of Brian Harrison fails to meet this criteria 
because no where does the affidavit provide or specify the 
sources consulted, when they were consulted, who in fact was 
consulted, or how they were consulted. Nor does the affidavit 
set forth the efforts to locate the defendant. The affidavit 
only contains bald statements. (See, Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
1269 (Utah 1987)). 
For example, paragraph 2 of the affidavit states that 
"[d]efendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided service 
of process . . . ." This paragraph is conclusory as to the state 
of mind of the defendant and is without any foundation. The 
plaintiff failed to provide any factual basis to substantiate 
this claim. Merely alleging that previous attempts have been 
made cannot support the statement that the defendant has avoided 
service of process. Moreover, at the time plaintiff moved for an 
enlargement of time there was no factual basis of any attempts 
made nor by whom they were made, how they were made, where they 
were made, and when they were made. Both of plaintiff's motions 
to enlarge time were inadequately supported. 
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In Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corporation, 545 P.2d 
507 (Utah 1976), defendant contended that the plaintiff's 
affidavit was insufficient to justify an order to publish 
summons. The court said at page 509: 
Concerning the sufficiency of the plaintiff's 
affidavit of jurisdictional facts: We recognize that 
such an affidavit is not sufficient if it state mere 
conclusions as to diligent search and inquiry. It must 
set forth facts upon which the court can base a 
judgment as to whether such diligence has been 
exercised to meet that requirement, (footnote omitted). 
(Emphasis added). 
There was no legal basis for plaintiff's motion because the 
affidavit of plaintiff's attorney was legally insufficient and 
failed to comply with Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
B. There was insufficient support for the enlargement of time 
to effectuate service of process. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time failed to meet the 
standards set forth in Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time is based upon and 
supported by the affidavit of Brian C. Harrison, attorney for 
plaintiff. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of this affidavit lack 
foundation and may be hearsay. (Record at 40-41). 
Rule 4 of Utah Civil Procedure requires that defendant be 
served with process "no later than 120 days after the filing of 
the complaint. Filing a motion to enlarge time for service of 
process nearly two (2) years after the filing of the complaint 
was not timely. 
The case of Motsinger v. Flvnt, 119 F.R.D. 373 (M.D.N.C. 
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1988) is helpful in identifying the proper use of discretion in 
granting an enlargement of time for service of process. The 
court said at page 375: 
If a party should wait until after the expiration of 
time, then the burden is more rigorous and requires 
more than inadvertence, mistake, or unfamiliarity with 
the rules. Rule 6(b)(2). Rather, the party must 
demonstrate his good faith, a reasonable basis for 
noncompliance, and lack of prejudice to defendant in 
making the untimely request for an extension. 4A C. 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1165 
(1987) . . . Motions for additional time to serve 
process made prior to the expiration of 120-day period 
of Rule 4(j) will be more liberally granted than those 
which are made after the expiration, (cite omitted). 
Motions for an extension of the service time made after 
the running of the 120-day period require a 
considerably greater showing of cause. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the district's court's extension of 
time for process beyond that time contemplated by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure was an abuse of discretion because of the 
absence of any factual basis in the record to support such 
extensions. 
CONCLUSION 
The inquiry to determine if the exercise of general 
jurisdiction would be proper is to decide whether the nonresident 
defendant had substantial and continuous contacts with the state. 
If the court finds the activities are not substantial and 
continuous then the court acting within the bounds of due process 
may not exercise general personal jurisdiction. When the facts 
of this case are compared to Helicopteros Nacionales, it is quite 
clear the district court did not have general personal 
jurisdiction over Mr. Mori. Accordingly, the inquiry should then 
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turn to whether the nonresident defendant, Mr. Morif had 
submitted himself to specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to 
the long-arm statute. 
Under the long-arm statute, the question is whether 
plaintiff's claim, or cause of action, arose from one of the 
enumerated activities of the nonresident defendant. The critical 
question is whether plaintiff's claim, or cause of action to 
recognize a Japanese divorce decree in Utah arose from the Mr. 
Mori's activity of helping his former wife purchase a home for 
her use and maintaining a checking account through which child 
support is paid. If the claim did not arise from the activity 
described in the long-arm statute, the nonresident defendant has 
not submitted himself to the specific personal jurisdiction of 
the court. "If the relevant state statute does not permit 
jurisdiction, then the inquiry is ended." (Arquello v« Industrial 
Woodworking Mach., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992)). 
Mr. Mori did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the 
district court. The enumerated subsections of Utah's long-arm 
statute are not directly related to the cause of action, or claim 
and therefore, the court lacks specific personal jurisdiction 
over Mr. Mori. 
Moreover, whether Mr. Mori, a resident of England, has 
performed pursuant to an alleged contract made in Tokyo, Japan 
ought not be the inquiry to determine whether the court has 
specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute. 
The inquiry should have been confined to whether the claim arose 
from one of the enumerated acts of the long-arm statute. 
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If the court should determine that there was no foundation 
for service of process, ought the court entertain the 
jurisdictional arguments? Mr. Mori is a resident of England and 
does not intend to return to Utah. Presumably, Mrs. Mori could 
have Mr. Mori properly served. If she does, the same 
jurisdictional facts and issues will exist and the same motions 
will likely be made. If the court concludes the district court 
should not have extended the time for service of process or 
granted enlargement of time after the 120-day period for service 
had expired then the jurisdiction argument will be moot. Because 
this case will likely be brought again on these same facts, it is 
urged upon the court to address the jurisdictional issues at this 
time. There is authority for this approach. 
This case deals with individuals who left Utah as students. 
Eventually, one of the parties became a resident and continues to 
be a resident of a foreign country. This type of circumstance 
becomes more common place as people from our society become more 
cosmopolitan. Therefore, this becomes an issue of "wide 
concern." Moreover, the controversy in this case will continue 
in another civil case if this case is dismissed upon the Rule 4 
issues. 
This court said in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
App. 1990), at page 1045: 
Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to 
avoid advisory opinions, we do not generally consider 
mooted questions on appeal, (cites omitted). 
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. This court 
has gone on to say: 
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A court may litigate an issue which, although 
technically moot as to a particular litigant at the 
time of appeal, is of wide concern, affects the public 
interest, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and 
because of the brief time any one person is affected, 
would otherwise likely escape judicial review. 
(Emphasis original) (Id. at 1046 (quoting Wickman v. 
Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981)). 
Accordingly, it is requested that the court rule on all 
issues presented. 
Dated this 12th day of October, 1994. 
D. YOTOG f 
Attorney for Defemiant/Appellant 
shawn\mori.bf 
RENT 
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HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3325 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-9801 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs-
GORDON WAYNE MORI ] 
Defendant. ] 
) COMPLAINT 
> Civil No. _2z4&Z£Mf 
COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through her attorney, Brian C 
Harrison, and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. On the 1st day of June, 1987, Plaintiff obtained a decree 
of divorce against the above-named Defendant in the Tokyo Family 
Court. A certified copy and translation thereof is attached hereto, 
marked Exhibit "A", and incorporated herein by reference. 
2. This action is brought pursuant to Section 78-22(a)-2 and 
other relevant statutes of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
3. The Tokyo Family Court, at and prior to the time of the 
institution of that cause, was and is at this time a Court having 
general jurisdiction. 
4. The foregoing decree was notarized by the Consul of the 
United States of America and the translation thereof was sworn to by 
Charles E. Robertson III, who was duly commissioned and qualified 
to act as Consul of the United States of America. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the divorce decree be 
registered in the above-entitled Court. 
DATED this 10th day of November, 1990. 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FiLED iH 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATr ^FJJTAH 
JfiH 3 M 33. Pll *9I 
HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3325 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-9801 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDIQAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHJXO SASAI MORI ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs- ] 
GORDON WAYNE MORI, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT 
> Civil No. f/sA/^t^Z' 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OFUTAH ) 
Brian C. Harrison, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. On November 19, 1987, a complaint was filed in the 
above-entitled Court under Civil No. CV-87-2572 which contained an 
6 
original certified copy of the decree of divorce and translation 
thereof which was entered in the Tokyo Family Court. 
3. The above copy is the only original existing and should be 
attached to the new complaint on file herein. 
4. Defendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided 
service of process in the previous complaint, service having been 
attempted in Tokyo, Japan and Los Angeles, California. 
5. Defendant now resides in London, England, and service 
upon said Defendant would best be accomplished as provided under 
Rule 4(f)(3) requiring the Defendant to be served by registered mail 
dispatched by the Clerk of the Court. 
6. Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this 1% day of November, 1990. 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ^ day of 
^Wt^Ju^ 1990. 
NOTARY CAMILLE8ROW&, 
HevwpvEUC'SmzcturAH \ 
216 NORTH 200 EAST #3 ! 
SPRiNGVlLLE,UT 84663 j 
'. mEXRJUN-5-34 
HILL, HARRISON, HILL & FISHER 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GORDON WAYNE MORI, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
I Civil No. 914400048 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Brian C. Harrison, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. The Complaint in this matter was filed on or about 
November 10, 1990, seeking to register a foreign divorce 
decree which was rendered in the Tokyo Family Court on June 1, 
1987. 
2. Defendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided 
service of process, service having been previously attempted 
in Tokyo, Japan, Los Angeles, California, and London, England. 
3. On January 9, 1991, by order of the above entitled 
Court, Plaintiff was granted to serve the Defendant by 
registered mail. 
4. Between January 17, 1991, and approximately April 1, 
1992, attempts were made to serve the Defendant by registered 
mail but said service was unsuccessful. 
5. Plaintiff has sought the assistance of the United 
States Department of State relative to personal service on the 
Defendant and has been provided the appropriate forms and 
documents to effect service through the Department of State in 
London, England. 
6. It is anticipated that service of process on the 
Defendant can be effected within the next ninety (90) days. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this /7 day of Mo^cmbor, 1992. 
f^  - /-
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s / 7 day of 
Qtfi/JrtM^ ,1992. 
x j - ^ SYLV5A A. BUNDRAffT 
' " " ^ ^ a NowrpuauC'Stffittum 
L W
 3319 NORTH UNI V.AVE. #200 
NIELSONHtLL & FISHER 
PflCVO, UTAH 84604 
COMM. EXP. 1-20-96 
XJMJ. $/j?j<t44jrS-$>^L——,.—-. 
NOTARY P<tJBLIC 
STATE Or:b^H 
HILL, HARRISON, HILL & FISHER 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI, 
Plaintiff, ) 
-vs-
GORDON WAYNE MORI, 
Defendant. 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
i BRIAN C. HARRISON 
i Civil No. 914400048 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Brian C. Harrisonf being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. The Complaint in this matter was filed on or about 
November 10, 1990, seeking to register a foreign divorce 
decree which was rendered in the Tokyo Family Court on June 1, 
1987. 
2 • Defendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided 
service of process, service having been previously attempted 
in Tokyo, Japan, Los Angeles, California, and London, England. 
3. On January 9, 1991, by order of the above-entitled 
Court, Plaintiff was granted permission to serve the Defendant 
by registered mail. 
4. Between January 17, 1991, and approximately April 1, 
1992, attempts were made to serve Defendant by registered 
mail, but said service was unsuccessful due to Defendant's 
refusal to accept the registered mail. 
5. Plaintiff has sought the assistance of the United 
States Department of State relative to personal service on 
Defendant and was provided the appropriate forms and documents 
to effect service through the Department of State in London, 
England. 
6. In March 1993, the Lord Chancellor's Department of 
Her Majesty's Service attempted service on the Defendant at 
his place of business, but Defendant refused to meet with said 
bailiff. 
7. It is anticipated that service of process on the 
Defendant can be effected within the next ninety (90) days. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this 1 ( day of April, 1993. 
Brian C. Harrisfen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
£ 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s A _ / day of 
A p r i l , 1 9 9 3 . 
TRAGI C. GOODMAN 
" ; y * r * N & S)0asyPB3L,S-SaTE^aH« 
\ i \ ^ $ A j 812 EAST 1550 SOUTH 
$ W t f CRE.M. UTAH 8*053 
^ Irotary P u b l i c 
COffli EXR M3-S7 j 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing on this /^/ day of 
%U fl , 1993, by first-class U.S. mail, postage J2& 
prepaid, to the following: 
Gordon Mori 
Ropemaker Place 
25 Ropemaker St. 
London, E.C. 2Y9LY 
^'t^C^^f^f^ 
>ecretary 
FILED IN 
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HILL, HARRISON, HILL & FISHER 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GORDON WAYNE MORI, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 914400048 
The Court having read the Motion to Enlarge Time 
submitted by the Plaintiff herein, and having reviewed the 
file, and being fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following ruling: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time to ninety (90) 
days from today's date is granted, and Plaintiff is directed 
to serve Defendant with a copy of the Summons and Complaint on 
file herein within said period• 
2. Plaintiff is given authority pursuant to Rule 4(g) 
to effect service upon Defendant by serving copies of the 
Summons and Complaint upon the Defendant personally, his 
secretary, his receptionist, or his wife, and to file a Return 
of Service with this Court evidencing the same. 
DATED this ^ > day of /iZ^JL^ 1993. 
Jud^e Boyd L7 Park 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing on this A_j day of 
(/^/J. \SJK 1993, by first-class U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Gordon Mori 
Ropemaker Place 
25 Ropemaker St. 
London, E.C. 2Y9LY 
Jretary 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHDCO SASAI MORI, 
vs. 
GORDON WAYNE MORI, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 914400048 
Judge: Boyd L. Park 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs 
Counsers Affidavits and Defendant's Motion to Quash Service of Process. The Court, 
having heard oral arguments and, having received and reviewed the complaint, motion to 
enlarge time, motion to challenge the jurisdiction of the court and to quash service of 
summons, response, motion to strike plaintiffs counsel's affidavits, and supplementary 
affidavit, and having heard oral arguments, makes the following findings and conclusions. 
1. The parties were divorced by order of the Tokyo Family Court on June 
1, 1987. 
2. A Complaint seeking to register the foreign decree was filed in the 
Fourth District Court on November 18, 1987. 
3. Defendant filed Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 1990. 
4. An Order of Dismissal was granted without prejudice on September 7, 
1990. 
5. A new Complaint was filed on January 9, 1991, Civil No. 914400048. 
6. An Order allowing service by registered mail was entered on January 
9, 1991. 
7. Proof of mailing by the District Court Clerk and a receipt for registered 
mail was dated January 17, 1991. 
8. An inquiry regarding a registered article is dated April 1, 1991. 
9. The Court filed an Order to Show Cause on July 11, 1991. 
10. The Court granted an Order of Dismissal on August 16, 1991 
11. The Court granted an Order to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal on 
October 24, 1991. 
12. Plaintiffs Counsel filed a Motion to Enlarge Time on December 18, 
1992. 
13. The Court granted the Motion to Enlarge Time on January 27, 1993. 
The Court allowed the time to be enlarged to April 1, 1993 
14. The Court granted a second Motion to Enlarge Time on April 22, 
1993. The Court allowed the time to be enlarged to July 22, 1993. The Court also allowed 
the Plaintiff to serve process upon the Defendant personally, his secretary, his receptionist, 
or his wife pursuant to Rule 4 (g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
15. The Defendant's Counsel argues that the lapse of time between the 
initial filing date of January 9, 1991 until date of service on April 30, 1993, in London, 
England violates Rule 4 (b) and 4 (g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Defendant's Counsel further claims that due to the violation of these rules, the Court has lost 
jurisdiction. 
16. Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part 
"[t]he summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later 
that 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer 
period of time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not 
timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application 
of any party or upon the court's own initiative." (emphasis added) 
As per Rule 4 (b) above, the action is set aside only on application by any party or the 
court's own initiative. The Court's Order to Set Aside Order of Dismissal was on October 
2 
24, 1991 and the Motion to Enlarge Time was filed on December 18, 1992. During this 
period of time, none of the parties moved for dismissal and the Court did not dismiss on its 
own initiative. 
17. On June 21, 1993, Defendant's Counsel filed a Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs Counsel's Affidavits. The Defendant's Counsel asserts that the Plaintiffs 
Counsel's Affidavit should be stricken because the statements are conclusory, not based on 
first-hand knowledge and as a result are tantamount to hearsay. Rule 4 (i) of the Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure explains the Manner of proof of service of process and how that manner 
of proof is amended. Rule 4 (i) states : 
"At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court 
may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it 
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of 
the party against whom the process issued." 
Rule 4 (g) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure explains that in dealing with supporting 
affidavits for other service,: 
H[T]he supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or 
serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it 
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties." 
The Supplementary Affidavit of Brian C. Harrison filed on July 1, 1993 fulfills the 
requirements of Rule 4 (g) by setting forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the 
Defendant. 
18. The Court in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems appropriate 
and just accepts the service of process and the accompanying affidavit of the Plaintiffs 
Counsel as sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure. 
19. The Court hereby denies the Defendant's Motion to Strike the 
3 
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Plaintiffs Counsel's Affidavit and denies the Defendant's Challenge to the Court's 
Jurisdiction to hear this case. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI 
vs. 
GORDON WAYNE MORI 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 914400048 
DATE: February 16, 1994 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
CLERK: LHH 
This matter came before the court on the special appearance of Mr. Brent Young, Esq. 
appearing for the defendant and challenging the jurisdiction of the court. The special 
appearance of attorney Young is not construed in any fashion as giving this court 
jurisdiction. Mr. Brian Harrison, Esq. appeared for the plaintiff. The court having read the 
memorandums of the parties in support of and in opposition to defendant's contention that 
this court does not have jurisdiction, and having heard oral arguments on February 11, 1994 
and being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings and conclusions: 
L The court adopts paragraphs 1-14 and paragraph 18 of its Memorandum Decision dated 
August 5, 1993 for a historical overview of the case. 
2. The Defendant, Gordon Wayne Mori, was born April 19, 1959 in Sandy, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. The Defendant lived in and maintained his residence in the state of 
Utah for all purposes until May 3, 1983. (See the uncontroverted Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai 
Mori and Application For License To Marry.) 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant were married April 23, 1983 in West Jordan, Utah. (See 
Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori and Application For License To Marry.) 
4. The court finds the Defendant was an actual and bona fide resident of the state of Utah 
for all purposes from date of birth o May 3, 1985. 
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5. Plaintiff and Defendant left the state of Utah May 3, 1985 to attend graduate school at 
Columbia University in New York City, New York. (See Affidavits of Toshiko Sasai Mori 
and Gordon Wayne Mori.) 
6. During the year of 1985 the Plaintiff returned to Sandy, Utah to live with Defendant's 
parents for a period of three weeks. The Defendant also returned to Sandy, Utah and spent 3 
days of the said 3 weeks with the Plaintiff and Defendant's parents. The parties then left for 
employment in Tokyo, Japan. (See Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori and Gordon Wayne 
Mori.) 
7. A child named Bryan was born to the parties on July 31, 1986 in Japan. (See Affidavit 
of Toshiko Sasai Mori.) 
8. In October of 1986 Defendant asked Plaintiff for a divorce. The Plaintiff refused. (See 
Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.) 
9. In January of 1987 Defendant returned to the state of Utah to purchase a home in 
Provo, Utah. (See Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.) 
10. In March of 1987 Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an Earnest Money Agreement to 
purchase a home in Orem, Utah. (See Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.) 
11. On March 30, 1987 and again on June 1, 1987 the Defendant executed powers of 
attorney authorizing his father to act in his behalf for all purposes regarding the purchase of 
a home and the execution of all documents concerning the purchase of a home in Orem, 
Utah. (See Exhibits A &B attached to the Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.) 
12. On June 25, 1987 the Plaintiff and Defendant (through his father as defendant's 
attorney in fact) and defendant's parents, Nobuo Mori and Kazuko Mori purchased a home 
for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff and child Bryan in Orem, Utah and executed a Deed 
of Trust and Note. (See Exhibits C & D attached to Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.) 
13. The Divorce Decree from Japan, entitled AWARD (Binding) which is translated into 
English and is attached to the Plaintiffs Complaint, contains the following provisions: 
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a. Dissolved the marriage, 
b. Granted custody of the child to Plaintiff (referred to in divorce decree as 
Respondent), 
c. Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay Respondent (Plaintiff) $30,000. $20,000 
at once, receipt of which is acknowledged by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the 
$10,000 to be paid by January 31, 1989 has not been paid. 
d. Required Petitioner (Defendant) to provide a house in Orem, Utah for the 
Respondent (Plaintiff) and title the property in the name of the Respondent 
(Plaintiff) within five (5) years at the sole cost of the Petitioner (Defendant). 
e. Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay to Respondent (Plaintiff) the sum of $800 
per month child support from June 1987 up to and including the child's twentieth 
(20) birthday, with the further provision that child support shall be reconsidered in 
accordance with changes in circumstances. Plaintiff alleges the Defendant has 
unilaterally reduced the child support to $400 per month even though Defendant 
has had a substantial increase of income. 
f. Petitioner (Defendant) was given the right to visit the child and Respondent 
. (Plaintiff) agreed to allow Petitioner's (Defendant's) parents to visit the child one 
jfi? weekend per month. 
^W* S^% ^^Qn^2Lnt maintains a bank account with his father at Zions First National Bank, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (See attached photocopy of check no. 554 dated Decgmber-27, 1993.) 
15. Defendant contends the state of Utah should not recognize a divorce decree from Japan, 
and that this court should not rely on the doctrine of comity as the Defendant refuses to 
submit himself to the personal jurisdiction of this court. Should this court find and conclude 
it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, then Defendant's argument is without merit. 
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16. Defendant next alleges this court is without jurisdiction as Utah's long-arm statute, §78-
27-24 Utah Code Annotated is not applicable to the Defendant. The court will now consider 
the provisions of §78-27-24 Utah Code Annotated as it may apply to the Defendant. 
78-27-24 "Any person, not withstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or 
not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any 
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any 
claim arising from:" 
"(1) the transaction of any business within this state;" 
It is clear the Defendant has transacted business in the state of Utah subsequent to the 
marriage of the parties. The Defendant either personally or through an agent contracted to 
purchase a home in Orem, Utah. The Defendant personally or through his agent makes the 
monthly payments on the home in Utah. The Defendant sends monthly child support 
payments to the Plaintiff by way of checks drawn on Zions Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Plaintiff and the child of the parties live in the home purchased by the parties during the 
course of their marriage. The Japan Divorce Decree contemplates the Plaintiff and the child 
of the parties would live in the state of Utah. The Supreme Court of this state has addressed 
general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction in Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Machine Co.. 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) at page 1122. 
"General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power over a 
defendant without regard to the subject of the claim asserted. For such 
jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting substantial and continuous 
local activity in the forum state. In contrast, specific personal jurisdiction gives a 
court power over a defendant only with respect to claims arising out of the 
particular activities of the defendant in the forum state/ 
The courtmnds^me Defendant is conducting substantial and continuous local activity in 
foe sta^ e of Utah. Even if the court could not find general personal jurisdiction the court 
could find specific personal jurisdiction on the claim of the Plaintiff as it relates to the 
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ownership of the Orem home as this arises out of a particular activity of the Defendant in the 
state of Utah. The divorce decree at paragraph no. 3 provides the Defendant will change the 
name of the tide holder to the Plaintiff within five years at the sole cost of the Defendant. 
The Defendant has failed to do so and the five year period was up on June 1, 1992. Further, 
in the exercise of due process the maintenance of the suit in the state of Utah does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Arguello at page 1123. There is 
no other forum in this world where fair play and substantial justice would be better served 
considering the circumstances of the parties. 
"(2) Contracting to supply services or goods to this state;" 
"(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty-/ 
Plaintiff has made out a fair case at the time of oral argument concerning these two 
sections and how this court would have jurisdiction. The court will not address these two 
sections as the court feels the stronger position is with sections (1), (4) and (6). 
"(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state;" 
There is no doubt the Defendant has an ownership interest in real estate in Orem, Utah 
as hereinbefore addressed. There appears to be no limiting language regarding this provision 
of the statute, and since part of Plaintiffs claim has to do with the ownership of the real 
estate, the court finds it has general personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
"(6) With respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, 
having resided in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent 
departure from the state. 
The Defendant was born and raised in the state of Utah and was a resident for all 
purposes up to the time of his marriage to the Plaintiff. The parties were married in Utah 
and left the state ten days later for Defendant's post graduate study in New York City at 
Columbia University. 
This court finds it has jurisdiction over the defendant under section 6 as follows: 
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a. The parties were married in Utah; 
b. Defendant was a resident of Utah for all purposes up to and beyond his marriage 
date; 
c. Utah was not merely a convenient place for marriage; 
d. The terms of the divorce decree contemplate the return to Utah; 
e. Defendant has visitation rights in Utah; 
f. Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who have visitation rights; 
g. The court cannot locate any case law which puts a time limit on how long the 
parties must reside within the state following marriage. 
17. The court further finds that the state of Utah is the only forum where it is fair and 
reasonable for the Plaintiff and Defendant to litigate the divorce decree as due process would 
be best served in the state of Utah. The Defendant is a resident of England, however the 
divorce was acquired in Japan. Neither party has any connection to Japan at this time. 
England does not have subject jurisdiction regarding the divorce and only limited personal 
jurisdiction. Neither party has any residential relationship to any other state and neither 
party has any significant connection with any other state. Should the court find that Utah 
Was not the proper forum for the litigation and that Utah had no jurisdiction over the 
Defendant, then Plaintiff would be without a remedy. Due process could never be served if 
Plaintiff was without a remedy. 
18. Defendant contends that the case of Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 is 
factually similar to this case and should be controlling. The court does not find the facts 
sufficiently similar to this case, and draws a distinction between the two cases. In doing so, 
the court does not find a disagreement with the majority decision in the Kulko case. 
19. Defendant's challenge of the court's jurisdiction is denied* 
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20. Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law and order 
consistent with the above and present the same to counsel for Defendant for approval as to 
form prior to presentment to the court for signature. 
21. Defendant shall have 30 days to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint, plus an additional ten 
days for mailing of this court's order to the Defendant following the court's signing of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and order. 
Dated this 16th day of February, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Brian Harrison, Esq. 
Brent Young, Esq. 
coo^j 
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GORDON WAYNE MORI, 
Defendant. 
i ORDER 
i Civil No. 914400048 
This matter having come on regularly before the Court on 
February 11, 1994, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her 
attorney, Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by 
his attorney Brent Young, and the Court having considered the 
challenge of Mr, Young to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the 
special appearance of Mr. Young not being construed in any fashion 
as giving this Court jurisdiction, and the Court having read the 
memorandums of the parties and having heard oral arguments, and 
being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
- FILED 
Jgrtft»Judicial District Court 
>puty 
1. Defendant's challenge to the Court's jurisdiction is 
denied. 
2. Defendant is granted 30 days to respond to Plaintiff's 
Complaint plus an additional 10 days for mailing of this Court's 
Order to the Defendant following the Court's signing of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
DATED this /% day of /AJ2^CA, 1994. ;' 
toy&A*. Park 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing on this >^2f/day of March, 1994, by first-
-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brent Young 
48 N. University Ave. 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
_^&L<?^ 
Secretary 
^3d 
£~ w/ ^ t 
-: > " - ! 3 rrj 3:13 
HILL, HARRISON & HILL 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI, 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs-
GORDON WAYNE MORI, 
Defendant. 
| AMENDED | AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT | AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 914400048 
This matter having come on regularly before the Court on 
February 11, 1994, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her 
attorney, Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by 
his attorney Brent Young, and the Court having considered the 
challenge of Mr. Young to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the 
special appearance of Mr. Young not being construed in any fashion 
as giving this Court jurisdiction, and the Court having read the 
memorandums of the parties and having heard oral arguments, and 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced by order of the Tokyo Family 
00 
Court on June 1, 1987, 
2. A Complaint seeking to register the foreign decree was 
filed in the Fourth District Court on November 18, 1987. 
3. Defendant filed Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 1990. 
4. An Order of Dismissal was granted without prejudice on 
September 7, 1990. 
5. A new Complaint was filed on January 9, 1991, Civil No. 
914400048. 
6. An Order allowing service by registered mail was entered 
on January 9, 1991. 
7. Proof of mailing by the District Court Clerk and a 
receipt for registered mail was dated January 17, 1991. 
8. An inquiry regarding a registered article is dated April 
1, 1991. 
9. The Court filed an Order to Show Cause on July 11, 1991. 
10. The Court granted an Order of Dismissal on August 16, 
1991. 
11. The Court granted an Order to Set Aside the Order of 
Dismissal on October 24, 1991. 
12. Plaintiff's Counsel filed a Motion to Enlarge Time on 
December 18, 1992. 
13. The Court granted the Motion to Enlarge Time on January 
27, 1993. 
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14. The Court granted a second Motion to Enlarge Time on 
April 22, 1993. The Court allowed the time to be enlarged to July 
22, 1993. The Court also allowed the Plaintiff to serve process 
upon the Defendant personally, his secretary, his receptionist, or 
his wife pursuant to Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
15. The Court in its discretion and upon such terms as it 
deems appropriate and just accepts the service of process and the 
affidavit of the Plaintiff's Counsel as sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
16. The Defendant, Gordon Wayne Mori, was born April 19, 
1959, in Sandy, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Defendant 
lived in and maintained his residence in the state of Utah for all 
purposes until May 3, 1983. (See the uncontroverted Affidavit of 
Toshiko Sasai Mori, dated November 5, 1993, and marked Exhibit "A" 
and the Application for License to Marry, dated April 15, 1983, and 
marked Exhibit "B".) 
17. Plaintiff and Defendant were married April 23, 1983, in 
West Jordan, Utah. (See attached Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B".) 
18. The Court finds the Defendant was an actual and bona fide 
resident of the state of Utah for all purposes from date of birth 
to May 3, 1983. 
19. Plaintiff and Defendant left the state of Utah May 3, 
3 
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1983, to attend graduate school at Columbia University in New York 
City, New York. (See attached Exhibit "A" and Affidavit of Gordon 
Wayne Mori, dated October 15, 1993, and marked Exhibit "C".) 
20. During the year of 1985 the Plaintiff returned to Sandy, 
Utah, to live with Defendant's parents for a period of three (3) 
weeks. The Defendant also returned to Sandy, Utah, and spent three 
(3) days of the said three (3) weeks with the Plaintiff and 
Defendant's parents. The parties then left for employment in 
Tokyo, Japan. (See attached Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "C".) 
21. A child named Bryan was born to the parties on July 31, 
1986, in Japan. (See attached Exhibit "A".) 
22. In October 1986, Defendant asked Plaintiff for a divorce. 
The Plaintiff refused. (See attached Exhibit "A".) 
23. In January 1987, Defendant returned to the state of Utah 
to purchase a home in Provo, Utah. (See attached Exhibit "A".) 
24. In March 1987, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an 
Earnest Money Agreement to purchase a home in Orem, Utah. (See 
attached Exhibit "A".) 
25. On March 30, 1987, and again on June 1, 1987, the 
Defendant executed powers of attorney authorizing his father to act 
in his behalf for all purposes regarding the purchase of a home and 
the execution of all documents concerning the purchase of a home in 
Orem, Utah. (See Exhibits "A" & "B" attached to the Affidavit of 
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Toshiko Sasai Mori, Exhibit "A" herein.) 
26. On June 25, 1987, the Plaintiff and Defendant (through 
his father as Defendant's attorney in fact) and Defendant's 
parents, Nobuo Mori and Kazuko Mori, purchased a home for the use 
and benefit of the Plaintiff and child Bryan in Orem, Utah, and 
executed a Deed of Trust and Note. (See Exhibits "C" & "D" 
attached to the Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori, Exhibit "A" 
herein.) 
27. The Divorce Decree from Japan, entitled AWARD (Binding) 
which is translated into English and is attached to the Plaintiff's 
Complaint, contains the following provisions: 
a. Dissolved the marriage; 
b. Granted custody of the child to Plaintiff (referred 
to in divorce decree as Respondent); 
c. Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay Respondent 
(Plaintiff) $30,000. $20,000 at once, receipt of which is 
acknowledged by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the $10,000 
to be paid by January 31, 1989, has not been paid; 
d. Required Petitioner (Defendant) to provide a house 
in Orem, Utah, for the Respondent (Plaintiff) and title the 
property in the name of the Respondent (Plaintiff) within five 
(5) years at the sole cost of the Petitioner (Defendant); 
e. Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay to Respondent 
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(Plaintiff) the sum of $800 per month child support from June 
1987, up to and including the child's twentieth (20) birthday, 
with the further provision that child support shall be 
reconsidered in accordance with changes in circumstances. 
Plaintiff alleges the Defendant has unilaterally reduced the 
child support to $400 per month even though Defendant has had 
a substantial increase of income; 
£. Petitioner (Defendant) was given the right to visit 
the child and Respondent (Plaintiff) agreed to allow 
Petitioner's (Defendant's) parents to visit the child one 
weekend per month. 
28. Defendant maintains a bank account with his father at 
Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. (See attached 
Exhibit "D".) 
29. Defendant contends the state of Utah should not recognize 
a divorce decree form Japan, and that this court should not rely on 
the doctrine of comity as the Defendant refused to submit himself 
to personal jurisdiction of this Court. Should this Court find and 
conclude it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, then 
Defendant's argument is without merit. 
30. Defendant next alleges this Court is without jurisdiction 
as Utah's long-arm statute, Section 78-27-24 Utah Code Annotated is 
not applicable to the Defendant. The Court will now consider 
6 
provisions of Section 78-27-24 Utah Code Annotated as it may apply 
to the Defendant. 
78-27-24 "Any person, not withstanding 
Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not ea citizen 
or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an 
individual, his personal representative, to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state 
as to any claim arising from:" 
"(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state;" 
It is clear the Defendant has transacted business in the state 
of Utah subsequent to the marriage of the parties. The Defendant 
either personally or through an agent contracted to purchase a home 
in Orem, Utah. The Defendant personally or through his agent makes 
the monthly payments on the home in Utah. The Defendant sends 
monthly child support payments to the Plaintiff by way of checks 
drawn on Zions Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah. The Plaintiff and the 
child of the parties live in the home purchased by the parties 
during the course of their marriage. The Japan Divorce Decree 
contemplates the Plaintiff and the child of the parties would live 
in the state of Utah. The Supreme Court of this state has 
addressed general personal jurisdiction and specific personal 
jurisdiction in Arauello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) at page 1122. 
"General personal jurisdiction permits a court to 
exercise power over a Defendant without regard to the 
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subject of the claim asserted. For such jurisdiction to 
exist, the Defendant must be conducting substantial and 
continuous local activity in the forum state. In 
contrast, specific personal jurisdiction gives a court 
power over a Defendant only with respect to claims 
arising out of the particular activities of the Defendant 
in the forum state." 
The Court finds the Defendant is conducting substantial and 
continuous activity in the state of Utah. Even if the Court could 
not find general personal jurisdiction the Court could find 
specific personal jurisdiction on the claim of the Plaintiff as it 
relates to the ownership of the Orem home as this arises out of a 
particular activity of the Defendant in the state of Utah. The 
divorce decree at paragraph no. 3 provides the Defendant will 
change the name of the title holder to the Plaintiff within five 
(5) years at the sole cost of the Defendant. The Defendant has 
failed to do so and the five (5) year period was up on June 1, 
1992. Further, in the exercise of due process the maintenance of 
the suit in the state of Utah does not offend traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice. See Arguello at page 1123. 
There is no other forum in this world where fair play and 
substantial justice would be better served considering the 
circumstances of the parties. 
"(2) Contracting to supply services or goods to this 
state;" 
"(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty;" 
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Plaintiff has made out a fair case at the time of oral 
argument concerning these two (2) sections and how this Court would 
have jurisdiction. The Court will not address these two (2) 
sections as the Court feels the stronger position is with sections 
(1), (4), and (6). 
"(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state;" 
There is no doubt the Defendant has an ownership interest in 
real estate in Orem, Utah, as hereinbefore addressed. There 
appears to be no limiting language regarding this provision of the 
statute, and since part of Plaintiff's claim has to do with the 
ownership of the real estate, the Court finds is has general 
personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. 
"(6) With respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided in the 
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding 
subsequent departure from the state..." 
The Defendant was born and raised in the state of Utah and was 
a resident for all purposes up to the time of his marriage to the 
Plaintiff. The parties were married in Utah and left the state ten 
(10) days later for Defendant's post graduate study in New York 
City at Columbia University. 
This Court finds is has jurisdiction over the Defendant under 
section (6) as follows: 
a. The parties were married in Utah; 
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b. Defendant was a resident of Utah for all purposes up 
to and beyond his marriage date; 
c. Utah was not merely a convenient place for marriage; 
d. The terms of the divorce decree contemplate the 
return to Utah; 
e. Defendant has visitation rights in Utah; 
f. Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who have 
visitation rights; 
g. The Court cannot locate any case law which puts a 
time limit on how long the parties must reside within the 
state following marriage. 
31. The Court further finds that the state of Utah is the 
only forum where it is fair and reasonable for the Plaintiff and 
Defendant to litigate the divorce decree as due process would be 
best served in the state of Utah. The Defendant is a resident of 
England, however, the divorce was acquired in Japan. Neither party 
has any connection to Japan at this time. England does not have 
subject jurisdiction regarding the divorce and only limited 
personal jurisdiction. Neither party has any residential 
relationship to any other state and neither party has any 
significant connection with any other state. Should the Court find 
that Utah was not the proper forum for the litigation and that Utah 
had no jurisdiction over the Defendant, then Plaintiff would be 
10 
without a remedy. Due process could never be served if Plaintiff 
was without a remedy. 
32. Defendant contends that the case of Kulko v. California 
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 is factually similar to this case and 
should be controlling. The Court does not find the facts 
sufficiently similar to this case, and draws a distinction between 
the two cases. In doing so, the Court does not find a disagreement 
with the majority decision in the Kulko case. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's challenge to the Court's jurisdiction is 
denied. 
2. Defendant is granted 30 days to respond to Plaintiff's 
Complaint plus an additional 10 days for mailing of this Court's 
Order to the Defendant following the Court's signing of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
DATED this /Q day of /"/^z^K^ 1994. 
Joyd L. Park 
District Court Judge / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
11 
copy of the foregoing on this //y*\- day of April, 1994, by first-
-lass U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brent Young 
48 N. University Ave. 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
"Secretary 
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This action was properly dismissed be^ 
cause it should not have been started in the 
first place. 
f o |KEYNUMBERSYSTEM^ 
ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC., a 
Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a 
Corporation, and Piper Corporate Air-
craft Center-West, a corporation, aka 
Corpac-West, Defendant and Respon-
dent. 
No. 15016. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 14, 1978. 
Airplane buyer sued Pennsylvania 
manufacturer of airplane and others to re-
cover damages for breach of contract, 
breach of warranty and mutual mistake. 
The defendant manufacturer's motion to 
quash service of summons upon it and to 
dismiss action for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion was granted by an order of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Marcellus 
K. Snow, J., and the buyer appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) 
jurisdictional standards should not be more 
restrictive than those allowed by federal 
due process limitations, and (2) review of 
conflict in affidavits showed that case must 
be remanded for hearing for resolution of 
conflicts and findings of fact. 
Reversed. 
1. Courts *» 12(2) 
State's jurisdictional standards under 
long-arm statute should not be more re-
strictive than those allowed by federal due 
process limitations. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-22. 
2. Appeal and Error <s=> 1177(7) 
In suit by airplane buyer against, 
among others, Pennsylvania corporate man-
ufacturer of airplane for breach of contract 
and breach of warranty in which defendant 
manufacturer moved to quash service of 
process under long-arm statute, conflicting 
affidavits of parties concerning facts sur-
rounding transaction and presence of corpo-
rate manufacturer in State of Utah re-
quired remand of case for purpose of hear-
ing where to resolve conflicts and entry of 
findings of fact as to whether manufactur-
er had subjected itself to jurisdiction of 
Utah courts. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-22. 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, F. Alan 
Fletcher, Kent W. Winterholler, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Christensen, Gardiner, Jensen & Evans, 
Ray R. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for 
Piper Aircraft. 
Snow, Christensen, & Martineau, John H. 
Snow, Salt Lake City, for Corpac-West. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
All statutory references are to Utah Code 
Ann., 1953, as amended, unless otherwise 
stated. 
On or about November 8, 1974, plaintiff, 
Abbott G. M. Diesel (hereinafter "Abbott"), 
and co-defendant, Piper Corporate Aircraft 
Center-West aka Corpac-West (hereinafter 
"Corpac"), entered into a purchase agree-
ment wherein Abbott agreed to buy, and 
Corpac agreed to sell, a Piper PA-31-P 
aircraft manufactured by co-defendant, 
Piper Aircraft Corporation (hereinafter 
"Piper"). 
Abbott contends that (1) this aircraft suf-
fered an inordinate number of equipment 
and structural failures and defects begin-
ning immediately after its delivery in No-
vember of 1974 and continuing regularly 
until January 9, 1976, and (2) these failures 
make this aircraft unairworthy, unreliable, 
not of marketable quality and unfit for its 
intended use. 
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Abbott's counsel wrote several letters to 
Piper, copies of which were sent to Corpac, 
informing Piper that the aircraft's numer-
ous malfunctions rendered it unsafe and 
unacceptable. Piper responded assuring 
Abbott that Piper would repair the aircraft 
at its expense in an attempt to make it 
airworthy. The aircraft was returned to 
Piper's plant at Lockhaven, Pennsylvania, 
and after Piper performed approximately 
thirty different repairs during a three week 
period, Piper informed Abbott that the air-
craft was in "good as new" condition. On 
the return trip of the aircraft to Utah, 
Abbott contends that it continued to mal-
function. 
Abbott commenced action in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County on February 23, 
1976, against co-defendants Corpac and Pip-
er for damages claiming breach of contract, 
breach of warranty, and mutual mistake. 
(Abbott claims mutual mistake against Cor-
pac only.) Abbott alleges it paid $308,-
646.27 for the aircraft and seeks damages 
against Piper in the approximate sum of 
$192,000.00. The summons was served on 
both defendants and specifically on Piper at 
its place of business in Pennsylvania pursu-
ant to Section 78-27-24 (Utah's Long-Arm 
Statute). Piper argues that it was not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts 
under this statute and moved to quash the 
service of summons upon it and dismiss the 
action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The 
District Court granted this motion against 
Piper, and Abbott appeals. 
In support of its motion to quash, Piper 
filed an affidavit of John Leeson, Treasurer 
of Piper, the substance of which states that: 
Piper is a Pennsylvania corporation en-
gaged in the business of manufacturing air-
planes; it has three manufacturing plants, 
one in Pennsylvania and two in Florida; it 
carries on no business in Utah and has no 
employees or agents here; Piper has no 
records, bank accounts, investments, prop-
erty, regional office, or affiliated company 
in Utah; there are some independent deal-
ers in Utah who sell Piper Aircraft but that 
Piper has no interest in, control over, or 
business arrangements with these dealers; 
there is an independent corporation known 
as Intermountain Piper Incorporated (here-
inafter "Intermountain"), authorized under 
the laws of the state of Utah and having its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which acts as a distributor of 
Piper aircraft and sells this aircraft to said 
dealers; Piper owns no interest in Inter-
mountain and the items of aircraft sold by 
Piper to Intermountain are sold F.A.F. (fly 
away basis) at Piper's manufacturing 
plants. 
Abbott, in resisting the motion to quash 
filed the affidavit of William Farley, Presi-
dent of Intermountain, the substance of 
which states that: Intermountain is a cor-
poration authorized under the laws of Utah; 
it is an authorized distributor of Piper by 
written contract between these two corpo-
rations and allows Intermountain to estab-
lish an organization in behalf of Piper for 
sale of Piper aircraft and other products 
within Utah and elsewhere; Piper initiated 
a program known as Piper Flight Centers 
for the purpose of establishing flight train-
ing in and rental of Piper aircraft, that 
program being available to Piper dealers 
and other airport operators through Piper 
distributors, including Intermountain; Pip-
er encourages its distributors, within their 
areas, to establish these centers, and that 
there were five such centers in Utah; a 
uniform type of sign called "Piper Flite 
Center" has been established by Piper for 
the centers; said signs are the property of 
Intermountain—in its area of responsibili-
ty—but become the property of Piper upon 
the termination of Intermountain's distribu-
torship; Intermountain has distributed to 
these centers information provided by Pip-
er; Piper has authorized the dealers to use 
the Piper Flight Center format, design, pro-
gram, system, lesson plans, and emblems as 
encouragement for the residents of Utah to 
rent, lease, or purchase Piper aircraft prod-
ucts; Intermountain has handled for trans-
mittal to Piper various warranty items for 
Piper from and through such dealers and 
has transmitted in behalf of Piper to said 
dealers various credits on warranty of Piper 
products; Piper employees from time to 
time inspect the dealers' facilities in Utah 
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for the purpose of approving them as Piper 
maintenance facilities or Piper Service Cen-
ters; Piper regularly distributes through 
the mail notices pertaining to its products 
to registered Piper aircraft owners within 
Utah. 
Abbott also filed an affidavit of Robert 
Abbott, President of Abbott, the substance 
of which states that: Abbott for several 
years has received numerous solicitations by 
direct mailing in the form of sales litera-
ture and other communications from Piper's 
corporation offices at Lockhaven, Pennsyl-
vania; Piper solicits business of Utahns, 
including Abbott, through advertisements 
placed in nationally circulated trade maga-
zines; and Piper employs a regional sales 
representative and a regional service repre-
sentative, both of whom reside outside of 
Utah, who regularly visit Utah at five to 
six week intervals to promote customer re-
lations and confer with Piper's sales outlets 
with respect to sales and service matters. 
The parties disagree in the affidavits 
about many of the enumerated facts and 
disagree about the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. Abbott contends that either un-
der a "doing business" or "minimum con-
tact" test that Piper has subjected itself to 
the jurisdiction of Utah Courts while Piper 
contends otherwise. No findings of fact 
were made or filed. We therefore reverse 
and remand for the purpose of having a 
hearing conducted below where conflicts 
may be resolved and findings of fact made. 
The Utah Legislature enacted the long-
arm statute in 1969* and it states in Sec. 
78-27-24 that any person submits to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Utah concerning any 
claim arising from the following acts: 
(1) The transaction of any business with-
in the state;2 
(2) Contracting to supply services or 
goods in this state; 
1. Sec. 78-27-22 to 28. 
2. Sec. 78-27-23(2) defines "transaction of busi-
ness within this state" as "activities of a non-
resident person, his agents, or representatives 
in this state which affect persons or businesses 
within the State of Utah". 
(3) The causing of any injury within this 
state whether tortious or by breach 
of warranty; 
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of 
any real estate situated in this state; 
(5) Contracting to insure any person, 
property, or risk located within this 
state at the time of contracting; 
(6) With respect to actions of divorce and 
separate maintenance, the mainte-
nance in this state of a matrimonial 
domicile at the time the claim arose 
or the commission in this state of the 
act giving rise to the claim. 
Sec. 78-27-22 in a statement of legislative 
policy and intent declares that the long-arm 
statute "should be applied so as to assert 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to 
the fullest extent permitted by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution".3 
As noted by Professor Kristine Strachan 
in her recent able article,4 
Prior to enactment of the long-arm 
statute there were three primary bases 
on which Utah assumed in personam jur-
isdiction over nonresident defendants. 
With respect to nonresident individuals, 
Utah assumed personal jurisdiction over 
defendants personally served with process 
while physically present in the state . 
[Additionally] personal jurisdiction could 
be asserted over a nonresident defendant 
as to tort claims arising out of the use or 
operation of a motor vehicle on Utah 
highways. Utah also assumed personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
found to be doing business within the 
state. [Citations omitted.] 
While it is true that this Court has stated 
that "if there is any difference between 
what is stated as the 'doing business* and 
3. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); 
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 
U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), 
and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). 
4. In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 Utah 
L.Rev. 235-36. 
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minimal contact' tests it is probably more 
in semantics than in substance,"5 we now 
conclude that from an examination of many 
individual cases concerning jurisdictional 
matters, including the present one, there 
can well be a significant and controlling 
difference in those two concepts.6 
The major concern of the parties is 
whether the long-arm statute, ante, applies, 
and therefore the discussion in this opinion 
basically revolves around that issue. 
[1] Though federal due process does not 
require this state—or, of course, any 
state—to enlarge the scope of personal jur-
isdiction allowed by the minimum contacts 
standard,7 initially announced in Interna-
tional Shoe, ante, still, because our Legisla-
ture in 19698 declared in clear, specific, and 
mandatory terms that the scope of that 
personal jurisdiction should be enlarged "to 
the fullest extent permitted by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment", this Court herein acknowledges that 
this state's jurisdictional standards should 
not be more restrictive than those allowed 
by federal due process limitations. 
The minimum contacts test springs from 
a measurement of the quality and nature of 
the defendant's activities within the forum 
state. We return to and cite International 
Shoe9 to vivify this point: 
It is evident that the criteria by which 
we mark the boundary line between those 
activities which justify the subjection of 
a corporation to suit, and those which do 
not, cannot be simply mechanical or 
quantitative. The test is not merely, as 
5. Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d 357, 360, 482 
P.2d 332, 334 (1971). 
6. See In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, supra, 
note 4, where the difference between these two 
tests is portrayed and documented; also note 
particularly the conclusion therein at page 264 
where it is stated: "General personal jurisdic-
tion is the concept reflected in a doing business 
statute, which requires substantial and continu-
ous local activity; specific personal jurisdiction 
is the concept applicable to a long-arm statute, 
which requires only minimum local contacts." 
Also see at pages 253-54 of this article com-
ments that "Where a defendant's forum-state 
activity is extensive, the forum may assert per-
sonal jurisdiction on either related or unrelated 
has sometimes been suggested, whether 
the activity, which the corporation has 
seen fit to procure through its agents in 
another state, is a little more or a little 
less. . Whether due process is 
satisfied must depend rather upon the 
quality and nature of the activity in rela-
tion to the fair and orderly administra-
tion of the laws which it was the purpose 
of the due process clause to insure. That 
clause does not contemplate that a state 
may make binding a judgment in person-
am against an individual or corporate de-
fendant with which the state has no con-
tacts, ties, or relations. . . . 
But to the extent that a corporation 
exercises the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within a state, it enjoys the bene-
fits and protection of the laws of that 
state. The exercise of that privilege may 
give rise to obligations; and, so far as 
those obligations arise out of or are con-
nected with the activities within the 
state, a procedure which requires the cor-
poration to respond to a suit brought to 
enforce them can, in most instances, 
hardly be said to be undue. [Emphasis in 
original. Citations omitted.] 
Hanson v. Denckla,10 in commenting on 
the requirement of minimum contacts, fur-
ther stated: 
The application of that rule 
will vary with the quality and nature of 
the defendant's activity, but it is essential 
in each case that there be some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activ-
claims (doing business concept). Where the 
defendant has only minimum contacts with the 
forum, personal jurisdiction may be asserted 
only on claims arising out of the defendant's 
forum-state activity" (long-arm or "transaction 
of business" concept). (Emphasis added—cita-
tions omitted.) 
7. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 
U.S. 437, 446, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952). 
8. Sec. 78-27-22. 
9. 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct at 159. 
10. 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240. 
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ities within the forum State, thus invok-
ing the benefits and protections of its 
laws. 
[2] The plaintiff, Abbott, alleges the 
commission by Piper of three acts enumer-
ated in Sec. 78-27-24, viz., transaction of 
business, contracting to supply services and 
goods, and breach of warranty—all within 
this state. The long-arm statute can be 
invoked only if there are allegations that 
one or more of the enumerated acts therein 
obtain. Also Abbott's complaint—in sub-
stance—alleges that its claims arose from 
these enumerated acts. 
The District Court, after remand, should 
as heretofore directed, conduct a hearing to 
resolve the conflicts of facts stated in the 
affidavits filed by the parties. And that 
hearing should be governed by inquiries 
into and a measurement of (a) the nature 
and quality of Piper's acts (b) whether Pip-
er engaged in purposeful—rather than un-
intentional—acts in order to avail itself of 
the privileges and protections here (and the 
substance—not just form—of Piper's busi-
ness relationship and acts should be as-
certained), and (c) any other relevant mat-
ters bearing on " 'notions of fair play and 
substantial justice'" n 
The comments made herein are made ad-
visedly, notwithstanding any previous adju-
dications of this Court which may seem to 
be to the contrary, and are made in order to 
infuse full vitality into the mandate by our 
Legislature to apply the long-arm statute to 
the fullest extent permitted by the Four-
teenth Amendment in order to provide "its 
citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who through 
certain significant minimal contacts with 
this state, incur obligations to citizens enti-
tled to the state's protection".12 
Reversed for action below consistent with 
this opinion. Costs to Abbott. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
CROCKETT and HALL, JJ., concur. 
O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM 
11. International Shoe, note 3, 326 U.S. at 317, 12. Sec. 78-27-22. 
66 S.Ct. at 158. 
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ed income of their subsidiary DISCs dis-
criminates against export shipping from 
other States, in violation of the Commerce 
Clause. The contrary judgment of the 
New York Court of Appeals is therefore 
reversed. 
Itis so ordered. 
466 VS. 408, 80 LJ2&2d 404 
J4P8HEUCOPTEROS NACIONALES DE 
COLOMBIA, S J U Petitioner, 
v. 
Elizabeth HALL et al. 
No. 82-1127. 
Argued Nov. 8, 1983. 
Decided April 24, 1984. 
Wrongful death action was instituted 
in a Texas state court against a Colombian 
corporation and others. Denying Colombi-
an corporation's motion to dismiss actions 
for lack of in personam jurisdiction over it, 
the District Court, Harris County, Wyatt 
H. Heard, J., entered judgment against cor-
poration on a jury verdict in favor of plain-
tiffs. Corporation appealed. The Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals, 616 S.W.2d 247, 
reversed and dismissed case for lack of 
jurisdiction, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Texas Supreme Court, 638 S.W.2d 870, re-
versed. Certiorari was granted. The Su-
preme Court, Justice Blackmun, held that 
Colombian corporation's contacts with Tex-
as, which consisted of one trip to Texas by 
corporation's chief executive officer for 
purpose of negotiating transportation ser-
vices contract, acceptance of checks drawn 
on Texas bank, and purchases of helicop-
ters and equipment from Texas manufac-
turer and related training trips, were insuf-
ficient to satisfy requirements of due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and hence to allow Texas court to assert in 
personam jurisdiction over corporation in 
wrongful death action. 
Texas Supreme Court judgment re-
versed. 
Justice Brennan dissented and filed an 
opinion. 
1. Federal Courts <*=>71 
Lack of residential or other contacts 
with forum state of itself does not defeat 
otherwise proper jurisdiction. 
2. Constitutional Law <s=>305<5) 
Due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment operates to limit the power of 
a state to assert in personam jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
3. Constitutional Law <s=>305(6) 
Due process requirements are satisfied 
when in personam jurisdiction is asserted 
over a nonresident corporate defendant 
that has certain minimum contacts with the 
forum such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
4. Constitutional Law *»305(6) 
Colombian corporation's contacts with 
Texas, which consisted of one trip to Texas 
by corporation's chief executive officer for 
purpose of negotiating transportation ser-
vices contract, acceptance of checks drawn 
on Texas bank, and purchases of helicop-
ters and equipment from Texas manufac-
turer and related training trips, were insuf-
ficient to satisfy requirements of due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and hence to allow Texas court to assert in 
personam jurisdiction over corporation in 
wrongful death action. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 14. 
5. Federal Courts «=>76.10 
Unilateral activity of another party or 
a third person is not an appropriate consid-
eration when determining whether a de-
fendant has sufficient contacts with a fo-
rum state to justify an assertion of jurisdic-
tion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE COLOMBIA, S.A. v. HALL 1869 
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6. Federal Courts <s=>84 Fourteenth Amendment and hence to allow 
Mere purchases in forum state, even if 
occurring at regular intervals, are not 
enough to warrant state's assertion of in 
personam jurisdiction over nonresident cor-
poration in cause of action not related to 
those purchase transactions. U.S.CA. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
Syllables * 
Petitioner, a Colombian corporation, 
entered into a contract to provide helicopter 
transportation for a Peruvian consortium, 
the alter ego of a joint venture that had its 
headquarters in Houston, Tex., during the 
consortium's construction of a pipeline in 
Peru for a Peruvian state-owned oil compa-
ny. Petitioner has no place of business in 
Texas and never has been licensed to do 
business there. Its only contacts with the 
State consisted of sending its chief execu-
tive officer to Houston to negotiate the 
contract with the consortium, accepting 
into its New York bank account checks 
drawn by the consortium on a Texas bank, 
purchasing helicopters, equipment, and 
training services from a Texas manufactur-
er, and sending personnel to that manufac-
turer's facilities for training. After a heli-
copter owned by petitioner crashed in Peru, 
resulting in the death of respondents' dece-
dents—United States citizens who were 
employed by the consortium—respondents 
instituted wrongful-death actions in a Tex-
as state court against the consortium, the 
Texas manufacturer, and petitioner. Deny-
ing petitioner's motion to dismiss the ac-
tions for lack of in personam jurisdiction 
over it, the trial court entered judgment 
against petitioner on a jury verdict in favor 
of respondents. The Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals reversed, holding that in person-
am jurisdiction over petitioner was lacking, 
but in turn was reversed by the Texas 
Supreme Court 
Held: Petitioner's contacts with Texas 
were insufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause of the 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re-
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
the Texas court to assert in personam 
jurisdiction over petitioner. The one trip to 
Houston by petitioner's chief executive of-
ficer for the purpose of negotiating the 
transportation services contract cannot be 
regarded as a contact of a "continuous and 
systematic" nature, and thus cannot sup-
port an assertion of general jurisdiction. 
Similarly, petitioner's acceptance of checks 
drawn on a Texas bank is of negligible 
significance for purposes of determining 
whether petitioner had sufficient contacts 
in Texas. Nor were petitioner's purchases 
of helicopters and equipment from the Tex-
as manufacturer and the related training 
trips a sufficient basis for the Texas 
court's assertion of jurisdiction. Rosen-
berg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 
U.S. 516, 43 S.Ct 170, 67 L.EA 372. Mere 
purchases, even if occurring at regular in-
tervals, are not enough to warrant 1409a 
State's assertion of in personam jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident corporation in a 
cause of action not related to the purchas-
es. And the fact that petitioner sent per-
sonnel to Texas for training in connection 
with the purchases did not enhance the 
nature of petitioner's contacts with Texas. 
Pp. 1872-1874. 
638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1982), reversed. 
Thomas J. 
petitioner. 
George E. 
respondents. 
Whalen, New York City, for 
Pletcher, Houston, Tex., for 
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opin-
ion of the Court 
We granted certiorari in this case, 460 
U.S. 1021, 103 S.Ct 1270, 75 L.E<L2d 493 
(1983), to decide whether the Supreme 
Court of Texas correctly ruled that the 
contacts of a foreign corporation with the 
State of Texas were sufficient to allow a 
Texas state court to assert jurisdiction over 
the corporation in a cause of action not 
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Go* 
200 VS. 321. 337, 26 S.O. 2S2, 287, 50 UEd. 
499. 
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arising out of or related to the corpora-
tion's activities within the State. 
I 
Petitioner Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. (Helicol), is a Colombian corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in 
the city of Bogota in that country. It is 
engaged in the business of providing heli-
copter transportation for oil and construc-
tion companies in South America. On 
j^ioJanuary 26, 1976, a helicopter owned by 
Helicol crashed in Peru. Four United 
States citizens were among those who lost 
their lives in the accident Respondents 
are the survivors and representatives of 
the four decedents. 
At the time of the crash, respondents' 
decedents were employed by Consorcio, a 
Peruvian consortium, and were working on 
a pipeline in Peru. Consorcio is the alter 
ego of a joint venture named Williams-Sed-
co-Horn (WSH).1 The venture had its head-
quarters in Houston, Tex. Consorcio had 
been formed to enable the venturers to 
enter into a contract with Petro Peru, the 
Peruvian state-owned oil company. Con-
sorcio was to construct a pipeline for Petro 
Peru running from the interior of Peru 
westward to the Pacific Ocean. Peruvian 
law forbade construction of the pipeline by 
any non-Peruvian entity. 
Consorcio/WSH2 needed helicopters to 
move personnel, materials, and equipment 
into and out of the construction area. In 
1974, upon request of Consorcio/WSH, the 
chief executive officer of Helicol, Francisco 
Restrepo, flew to the United States and 
conferred in Houston with representatives 
of the three joint venturers. At that meet-
ing, there was a discussion of prices, avail-
ability, working conditions, fuel, supplies, 
and housing. Restrepo represented that 
1. The participants in the joint venture were 
Williams International Sudamericana, Ltd-, a 
Delaware corporation; Sedco Construction Cor-
poration, a Texas corporation; and Horn inter-
national, Inc., a Texas corporation. 
2. Throughout the record in this case the entity 
is referred to both as Consorcio and as WSH. 
We refer to it hereinafter as Consorcio/WSH. 
Helicol could have the first helicopter on 
the job in 15 days. The Consorcio/WSH 
representatives decided to accept the con-
tract proposed by Restrepo. Helicol began 
performing before the agreement was for-
mally signed in Peru on November 11, 
1974.3 The contract was written in Spanish 
on Unofficial government stationery and 
provided that the residence of all the par-
ties would be Lima, Peru. It further stat-
ed that controversies arising out of the 
contract would be submitted to the jurisdic-
tion of Peruvian courts. In addition, it 
provided that Consorcio/WSH would make 
payments to Hehcol's account with the 
Bank of America in New York City. App. 
12a. 
Aside from the negotiation session in 
Houston between Restrepo and the repre-
sentatives of Consorcio/WSH, Helicol had 
other contacts with Texas. During the 
years. 1970-1977, it ^urcha&ed tetiea^ters. 
(approximately 80% of its fleet), spare 
parts, and accessories for more than $4 
million from Bell Helicopter Company in 
Fort Worth. In that period, Helicol sent 
prospective pilots to Fort Worth for train-
ing and to ferry the aircraft to South 
America. It also sent management and 
maintenance personnel to visit Bell Helicop-
ter in Fort Worth during the same period in 
order to receive "plant familiarization" and 
for technical consultation. Helicol received 
into its New York City and Panama City, 
Fla., bank accounts over $5 million in pay-
ments from Consorcio/WSH drawn upon 
First City National Bank of Houston. 
[1] Beyond the foregoing, there have 
been no other business contacts between 
Helicol and the State of Texas. Helicol 
never has been authorized to do business in 
Texas and never has had an agent for the 
3. Respondents acknowledge that the contract 
was executed in Peru and not in the United 
States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-23. See App. 79a; 
Brief for Respondents 3. 
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service of process within the State. It nev-
er has performed helicopter operations in 
Texas or sold any product that reached 
Texas, never solicited business in Texas, 
never signed any contract in Texas, never 
had any employee based there, and never 
recruited an employee in Texas. In addi-
tion, Helicol never has owned real or per-
sonal property in Texas and never has 
maintained an office or establishment 
there. Helicol has maintained no records 
in Texas and has no shareholders in that 
State.4 None of the | ^ respondents or 
their decedents were domiciled in Texas, 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, 18,5 but all of the 
decedents were hired in Houston by 
Consorcio/WSH to work on the Petro Peru 
pipeline project 
Respondents instituted wrongful-death 
actions in the District Court of Harris 
County, Tex., against Consorcio/WSH, Bell 
Helicopter Company, and Helicol. Helicol 
filed special appearances and moved to dis-
miss the actions for lack of in personam 
jurisdiction over i t The motion was de-
4. The Colombian national airline, Aerovias Na-
cionales de Colombia, owns approximately 94% 
of Helicol's capital stock. The remainder is 
held by Aerovias Corporation de Viajes and 
four South American individuals. See Brief for 
Petitioner 2, n. 2. 
5. Respondents' lack of residential or other con-
tacts with Texas of itself does not defeat other-
wise proper jurisdiction. Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 US. 770, 780, 104 S.0.1473, 
1481, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984); Colder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 S.O. 1482, 1486. 79 
L.EcL2d 804 (1984). We mention respondents' 
lack of contacts merely to show that nothing in 
the nature of the relationship between respon-
dents and Helicol could possibly enhance Heli-
col's contacts with Texas. The harm suffered by 
respondents did not occur in Texas. Nor is it 
alleged that any negligence on the part of Heli-
col took place in Texas. 
6. Defendants Consorcio/WSH and Bell Helicop-
ter Company were granted directed verdicts 
with respect to respondents' claims against 
them. Bell Helicopter was granted a directed 
verdict on Helicol's cross-claim against it. App. 
167a. Consorcio/WSH, as cross-plaintiff in a 
claim against Helicol, obtained a judgment in 
the amount of $70,000. IcL, at 174a. 
7. The State's long-arm statute is TexJUv.Civ. 
StatAnn., Art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 and Supp. 
1982-1983). It reads in relevant part: 
nied. After a consolidated jury trial, judg-
ment was entered against Helicol on a jury 
verdict of $1,141,200 in favor of respon-
dents.6 App. 174a. 
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Hous-
ton, First District, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, holding that in per-
sonam jurisdiction over Helicol was lack-
ing. 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.1981). The Su-
preme Court of Texas, with three justices 
dissenting, initially affirmed the judgment 
of the Court of Civil Appeals. App. to Pet 
for Cert 46a-62a. Seven months later, 
however, on motion for rehearing, the 
court withdrew its prior opinions and, again 
with three justices dissenting, reversed the 
judgment of the intermediate court 638 
S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1982). In ruling that the 
Texas courts had U\&in personam jurisdic-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court first held 
that the State's long-arm statute reaches 
as far as the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment permits. Id., at 
872.7 Thus, the only question remaining 
"Sec. 3. Any foreign corporation . . . that en-
gages in business in this State, irrespective of 
any Statute or law respecting designation or 
maintenance of resident agents, and does not 
maintain a place of regular business in this 
State or a designated agent upon whom service 
may be made upon causes of action arising out 
of such business done in this State, the act or 
acts of engaging in such business within this 
State shall be deemed equivalent to an appoint-
ment by such foreign corporation . . . of the 
Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon whom 
service of process may be made in any action, 
suit or proceedings arising out of such business 
done in this State, wherein such corporation . . . 
is a party or is to be made a party. 
"Sec. 4. For the purpose of this Act and 
without including other acts that may constitute 
doing business, any foreign corporation . . . 
shall be deemed doing business in this State by 
entering into contract by mail or otherwise with 
a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or 
in part by either party in this State, or the 
committing of any tort in whole or in part in 
this State. The act of recruiting Texas residents, 
directly or through an intermediary located in 
Texas, for employment inside or outside of Tex-
as shall be deemed doing business in this State." 
The last sentence of § 4 was added by 1979 
Tex.GenJLaws, ch. 245, § 1, and became effec-
tive August 27, 1979. 
The Supreme Court of Texas in its principal 
opinion relied upon rulings in (/-Anchor Adver-
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for the court to decide was whether it was 
consistent with the Due Process Clause for 
Texas courts to assert in personam juris-
diction over Helicol. Ibid. 
II 
[2,3] The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment operates to limit 
the power of a State to assert in personam 
14iJurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 
L.Ed. 565 (1878). Due process require-
ments are satisfied when in personam jur-
isdiction is asserted over a nonresident cor-
porate defendant that has "certain mini-
mum contacts with [the forum] such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice/ " International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct 
154,158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Millik-
en v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct 339, 
342, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). When a contro-
versy is related to or "arises out o f a 
defendant's contacts with the forum, the 
Court has said that a "relationship among 
the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion" is the essential foundation of in per-
sonam jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct 2569, 2579, 53 
L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).* 
Even when the cause of action does not 
arise out of or relate to the foreign corpo-
ration's activities in the forum State,9 due 
process is not offended by a State's sub-
jecting the corporation to its in personam 
jurisdiction when there are sufficient con-
tising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.1977); 
Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (TexXiv. 
App.1973); and O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 
S.W.2d 340 (Tex.1966). It is not within our 
province, of course, to determine whether the 
Texas Supreme Court correctly interpreted the 
State's long-arm statute. We therefore accept 
that court's holding that the limits of the Texas 
statute are coextensive with those of the Due 
Process Clause. 
8- It has been said that when a State exercises 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit 
arising out of or related to the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum, the State is exercising 
"specific jurisdiction" over the defendant See 
Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adju-
tacts between the State and the foreign 
corporation. Perkins v. Benguet Consol-
idated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct 
413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952); see Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-
780, 104 S.Ct 1473, 1480-1481, 79 L.Ed.2d 
790 (1984). In Perkins, the Court ad-
dressed a situation in which state courts 
had asserted general jurisdiction over a 
defendant foreign corporation. During the 
Japapese4is occupation of the Philippine Is-
lands, the president and general manager 
of a Philippine mining corporation main-
tained an office in Ohio from which he 
conducted activities on behalf of the compa-
ny. He kept company files and held di-
rectors' meetings in the office, carried on 
correspondence relating to the business, 
distributed salary checks drawn on two ac-
tive Ohio bank accounts, engaged an Ohio 
bank to act as transfer agent, and super-
vised policies dealing with the rehabilita-
tion of the corporation's properties in the 
Philippines. In short, the foreign corpora-
tion, through its president, "ha[d] been 
carrying on in Ohio a continuous and sys-
tematic, but limited, part of its general 
business," and the exercise of general jur-
isdiction over the Philippine corporation by 
an Ohio court was "reasonable and just" 
342 U.S., at 438, 445, 72 S.Ct, at 414, 418. 
[4] All parties to the present case con-
cede that respondents' claims against Heli-
col did not "arise out of," and are not 
related to, Helicol's activities within Tex-
as.10 We thus must Uisexplore the nature 
dicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 
1121, 1144-1164 (1966). 
9. When a State exercises personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or 
related to the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum, the State has been said to be exercising 
"general jurisdiction" over the defendant See 
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 
S.CtRev. 77, 80-31; Von Mehren & Trautman, 
79 HarvX.Rev.. at 1136-1144; Colder v. Jones, 
465 VS., at 786,104 S.CL, at 1485. 
10. See Brief for Respondents 14; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 26-27, 30-31. Because the parties have not 
argued any relationship between the cause of 
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of Helicol's contacts with the State of Tex-
as to determine whether they constitute the 
kind of continuous and systematic general 
business contacts the Court found to exist 
in Perkins. We hold that they do not 
It is undisputed that Helicol does not 
have a place of business in Texas and never 
has been licensed to do business in the 
State. Basically, Helicol's contacts with 
Texas consisted of sending its chief execu-
tive officer to Houston for a contract-nego-
tiation session; accepting into its New 
York bank account checks drawn on a 
Houston bank; purchasing helicopters, 
equipment, and training services from Bell 
Helicopter for substantial sums; and send-
ing personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort 
Worth for training. 
[5] The one trip to Houston by Helicol's 
chief executive officer for the purpose of 
negotiating the transportation-services con-
tract with Consorcio/WSH cannot be de-
scribed or regarded as a contact of a "con-
tinuous and systematic" nature, as Perkins 
described it, see also International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., at 320, 66 
S.Ct, at 160, and thus cannot support an 
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over 
Helicol by a Texas court Similarly, Heli-
col's acceptance from Consorcio/WSH of 
checks drawn on a Texas bank is of negligi-
ble significance for purposes of determin-
ing whether Helicol had sufficient contacts 
action and Helicol's contacts with the State of 
Texas, we, contrary to the dissent's implication, 
post, at 1873, assert no "view" with respect to 
that issue. 
The dissent suggests that we have erred in 
drawing no distinction between controversies 
that "relate to" a defendants contacts with a 
forum and those that "arise out of* such con-
tacts. Post at 1875. This criticism is somewhat 
puzzling, for the dissent goes on to urge that, for 
purposes of determining the constitutional va-
lidity of an assertion of specific jurisdiction, 
there really should be no distinction between 
the two. Post, at 1879. 
We do not address the validity or conse-
quences of such a distinction because the issue 
has not been presented in this case. Respon-
dents have made no argument that their cause 
of action either arose out of or is related to 
Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas. Ab-
sent any briefing on the issue, we decline to 
in Texas. There is no indication that Heli-
col ever requested that the checks be 
drawn on a Texas bank or that there was 
any negotiation between Helicol and 
Consorcio/WSH with respect to the loca-
tion or identity of the bank on which checks 
would be drawn. Common sense and 
everyday experience suggest that absent 
unusual circumstances,11 the bank on which 
a check is drawn is generally of little 
Urrconsequence to the payee and is a mat-
ter left to the discretion of the drawer. 
Such unilateral activity of another party or 
ajbhird person is not an appropriate consid-
eration when determining whether a de-
fendant has sufficient contacts^  .wjth_a _fp-
nim "State to justify an assertion, oljurisr 
diction. See Kulko v. California Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 S.Ct 1690,1697, 
56 UEA2d 132 (1978) (arbitrary to subject 
one parent to suit in any State where other 
parent chooses to spend time while having 
custody of child pursuant to separation 
agreement); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 253, 78 STCr-I228T123g; 2 LEA2d 
1283 (1958) ('The unilateral activity of 
those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the 
requirement of contact with the_ fqriun 
State"); see also Lilly, Jurisdiction Over 
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VaX. 
Rev. 85, 99 (1983). 
The Texas Supreme Court focused on the 
purchases and the related training trips in 
reach the questions (1) whether the terms "aris-
ing out o^ and "related to" describe different 
connections between a cause of action and a 
defendant's contacts with a forum, and (2) what 
sort of tie between a cause of action and a 
defendant's contacts with a forum is necessary 
to a determination that either connection exists, 
Nor do we reach the question whether, if the 
two types of relationship differ, a forum's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where 
the cause of action "relates to," but does not 
"arise out of," the defendant's contacts with the 
forum should be analyzed as an assertion of 
specific jurisdiction. 
11. For example, if the financial health and con-
tinued ability of the bank to honor the draft are 
questionable, the payee might request that the 
check be drawn on an account at some other 
institution. 
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finding contacts sufficient to support an 
assertion of jurisdiction. We do not agree 
with that assessment, for the Court's opin-
ion in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis 
Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 43 S.Ct 170, 67 
L.Ed. 372 (1923) (Brandeis, J., for a unani-
mous tribunal), makes clear that purchases 
and related trips, standing alone, are not a 
sufficient basis for a State's assertion of 
jurisdiction. 
The defendant in Rosenberg was a small 
retailer in Tulsa, Okla., who dealt in men's 
clothing and furnishings. It never had ap-
plied for a license to do business in New 
York, nor had it at any time authorized suit 
to be brought against it there. It never 
had an established place of business in 
New York and never regularly carried on 
business in that State. Its only connection 
with New York was that it purchased from 
New York wholesalers a large portion of 
the merchandise sold in its Tulsa store. 
The purchases sometimes were made by 
correspondence and sometimes through vis-
its to New York by an officer of the de-
fendant The Court concluded: "Visits on 
such business, even if occurring at regular 
intervals, would not warrant the inference 
that the corporation was present within the 
jurisdiction of [New York]." Id., at 518, 43 
S.Ct, at 171. 
[63 UisThis Court in International 
Shoe acknowledged and did not repudiate 
its holding in Rosenberg. See 326 U.S., at 
318, 66 S.Ct, at 159. In accordance with 
12. This Court in International Shoe cited Rosen-
berg for the proposition that "the commission of 
some single or occasional acts of the corporate 
agent in a state sufficient to impose an obli-
gation or liability on the corporation has not 
been thought to confer upon the state authority 
to enforce i f 326 U.S., at 318, 66 S.O., at 159. 
Arguably, therefore, Rosenberg also stands for 
the proposition that mere purchases are not a 
sufficient basis for either general or specific 
jurisdiction. Because the case before us is one 
in which there has been an assertion of general 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, we need 
not decide the continuing validity of Rosenberg 
with respect to an assertion of specific jurisdic-
tion, Le., where the cause of action arises out of 
or relates to the purchases by the defendant in 
the forum State. 
Rosenberg, we hold that mere purchases, 
even if occurring at regular intervals, are 
not enough to warrant a State's assertion 
of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent corporation in a cause of action not 
related to those purchase transactions.12 
Nor can we conclude that the fact that 
Helicol sent personnel into Texas for train-
ing in connection with the purchase of heli-
copters and equipment in that State in any 
way enhanced the nature of Helicol's con-
tacts with Texas. The training was a part 
of the package of goods and services pur-
chased by Helicol from Bell Helicopter. 
The brief presence of Helicol employees in 
Texas for the purpose of attending the 
training sessions is no more a significant 
contact than were the trips to New York 
made by the buyer for the retail store in 
Rosenberg. See also Kulko v. California 
Superior Court, 436 U.S., at 93, 98 S.Ct, 
at 1697 (basing California jurisdiction on 
3-day and 1-day stopovers in that State 
"would make a mockery o f due process 
limitations on assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion). 
HI 
We hold that Helicol's contacts with the 
State of Texas were insufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of the Due Proqsss4i9 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment13 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Texas. 
It is so ordered. 
13. As an alternative to traditional minimum-
contacts analysis, respondents suggest that the 
Court hold that the State of Texas had personal 
jurisdiction over Helicol under a doctrine of 
"jurisdiction by necessity.,, See Shaffer v. Heit-
nert 433 VS. 186, 211. n. 37, 97 S.Ct 2569, 2583, 
n. 37, 53 UEd.2d 683 (1977). We conclude, 
however, that respondents failed to carry their 
burden of showing that all three defendants 
could not be sued together in a single forum. It 
is not clear from the record, for example, 
whether suit could have been brought against 
all three defendants in either Colombia or Peru. 
We decline to consider adoption of a doctrine of 
jurisdiction by necessity—a potentially far-
reaching modification of existing law—in the 
absence of a more complete record. 
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Justice BRENNAN, dissenting. causes of action that "arise out o f such 
Decisions applying the Due Process contacts, the Court may be placing severe  
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
determine whether a State may constitu-
tionally assert in personam jurisdiction 
over a particular defendant for a particular 
* cause of action most often turn on a weigh-
ing of facts. See, e.g., Kulko v. California 
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 
1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); id, at 
101-102, 98 S.Ct, at 1701-1702 (BREN-
NAN, J., dissenting). To a large extent, 
today's decision follows the usual pattern. 
Based on essentially undisputed facts, the 
Court concludes that petitioner Helicol's 
contacts with the State of Texas were in-
sufficient to allow the Texas state courts 
constitutionally to assert "general jurisdic-
tion" over all claims filed against this for-
eign corporation. Although my indepen-
dent weighing of the facts leads me to a 
different conclusion, see infra, at 1877, the 
Court's holding on this issue is neither im-
plausible nor unexpected. 
What is troubling about the Court's opin-
ion, however, are the implications that 
might be drawn from the way in which the 
Court approaches the constitutional issue it 
addresses. First, the Court limits its dis-
cussion to an assertion of general jurisdic-
tion of the Texas courts because, in its 
view, the ^underlying cause of action 
does "not arisfe] out of or relatfe] to the 
corporation's activities within the State." 
Ante, at 1870. Then, the Court relies on a 
1923 decision in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. 
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 43 S.Ct 
170, 67 LEd. 372, without considering 
whether that case retains any validity after 
our more recent pronouncements concern-
ing the permissible reach of a State's juris-
diction. By posing and deciding the ques-
tion presented in this manner, I fear that 
the Court is saying more than it realizes 
about constitutional limitations on the po-
tential reach of in personam jurisdiction. 
In particular, by relying on a precedent 
whose premises have long been discarded, 
and by refusing to consider any distinction 
between controversies that "relate to" a 
defendant's contacts with the forum and 
limitations on the type and amount of con-
tacts that will satisfy the constitutional 
minimum. 
In contrast, I believe that the undisputed 
contacts in this case between petitioner 
Helicol and the State of Texas are suffi-
ciently important, and sufficiently related 
to the underlying cause of action, to make 
it fair and reasonable for the State to as-
sert personal jurisdiction over Helicol for 
the wrongful-death actions filed by the re-
spondents. Given that Helicol has purpose-
fully availed itself of the benefits and obli-
gations of the forum, and given the direct 
relationship between the underlying cause 
of action and Helicol's contacts with the 
forum, maintenance of this suit in the Tex-
as courts "does not offend [the] 'traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice/" International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct 154, 90 
L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct 339, 342, 85 
L.Ed. 278 (1940)), that are the touchstone 
of jurisdictional analysis under the Due 
Process Clause. I therefore dissent 
I 
The Court expressly limits its decision in 
this case to "an assertion of general juris-
diction over a foreign defendant" j ^ i 
Ante, at 1874, n. 12. See ante, at 1873, 
and n. 10. Having framed the question in 
this way, the Court is obliged to address 
our prior holdings in Perkins v. Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 
S.Ct 413, 96 L.EA 485 (1952), and Rosen-
berg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 
supra. In Perkins, the Court considered a 
State's assertion of general jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation that "ha[d] been 
carrying on . . . a continuous and system-
atic, but limited, part of its general busi-
ness" in the forum. 342 U.S., at 438, 72 
S.Ct, at 414. Under the circumstances of 
that case, we held that such contacts were 
constitutionally sufficient "to make it rea-
sonable and just to subject the corporation 
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to the jurisdiction" of that State. Id., at 
445, 72 S.Ct, at 418 (citing International 
Shoe, supra, 326 U.S., at 317-320, 66 S.Ct, 
at 158-160). Nothing in Perkins suggests, 
however, that such "continuous and sys-
tematic" contacts are a necessary minimum 
before a State may constitutionally assert 
general jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion. 
The Court therefore looks for guidance 
to our 1923 decision in Rosenberg, supra, 
which until today was of dubious validity 
given the subsequent expansion of personal 
jurisdiction that began with International 
Shoe, supra, in 1945. In Rosenberg, the 
Court held that a company's purchases 
within a State, even when combined with 
related trips to the State by company offi-
cials, would not allow the courts of that 
State to assert general jurisdiction over all 
claims against the nonresident corporate 
defendant making those purchases.1 
^Reasoning by analogy, the Court in this 
case concludes that Helicors contacts with 
the State of Texas are no more significant 
than the purchases made by the defendant 
in Rosenberg. The Court makes no at-
tempt, however, to ascertain whether the 
narrow view of in personam jurisdiction 
adopted by the Court in Rosenberg com-
ports with "the fundamental transforma-
tion of our national economy" that has 
occurred since 1923. McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-223, 
78 S.Ct 199, 200-201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). 
See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-293, 100 S.Ct 
559, 564-565, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); id., at 
308-309,100 S.Ct, at 585-586 (BRENNAN, 
J., dissenting); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 250-251, 78 S.Ct 1228,1237-1238, 
1. The Court leaves open the question whether 
the decision in Rosenberg was intended to ad-
dress any constitutional limits on an assertion 
of "specific jurisdiction." Ante, at 1874, n. 12 
(citing International Shoe, 326 U.S., at 318, 66 
S.Ct., at 159). If anything is clear from Justice 
Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Rosenberg, 
however, it is that the Court was concerned only 
with general jurisdiction over the corporate de-
fendant See 260 U.S., at 517, 43 S.Ct, at 171 
(The sole question for decision is whether . . . 
defendant was doing business within the State 
2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); id, at 260, 78 S.Ct, 
at 1243 (Black, J., dissenting). This failure, 
in my view, is fatal to the Court's analysis. 
The vast expansion of our national econo-
my during the past several decades has 
provided the primary rationale for expand-
ing the permissible reach of a State's juris-
diction under the Due Process Clause. By 
broadening the type and amount of busi-
ness opportunities available to participants 
in interstate and foreign commerce, our 
economy has increased the frequency with 
which foreign corporations actively pursue 
commercial transactions throughout the 
various States. In turn, it has become both 
necessary and, in my view, desirable to 
allow the States more leeway in bringing 
the activities of these nonresident corpora-
tions within the scope of their respective 
jurisdictions. 
This is neither a unique nor a novel idea. 
As the Court first noted in 1957: 
"[M]any commercial transactions touch 
two or more States and may involve par-
ties separated by the full continent 
With this increasing nationalization of 
commerce has come a great increase in 
the amount of business conducted by 
mail across state lines. At thej^same 
time modern transportation and commu-
nication have made it much less burden-
some for a party sued to defend himself 
in a State where he engages in economic 
activity." McGee, supra, at 222-223, 78 
S.Ct, at 200-201. 
See also World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 
444 U.S., at 293,100 S.Ct, at 565 (reaffirm-
ing that "[t]he historical developments not-
ed in McGee . . . have only accelerated in 
the generation since that case was decid-
of New York in such manner and to such extent 
as to warrant the inference that it was present 
there"); id., at 518, 43 S.Ct, at 171 (the corpora-
tion's contacts with the forum "would not war-
rant the inference that the corporation was 
present within the jurisdiction of the State"); 
ante, at 1874. The Court's resuscitation of 
Rosenberg, therefore, should have no bearing 
upon any forum's assertion of jurisdiction over 
claims that arise out of or relate to a defendant's 
contacts with the State. 
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ed"); Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S., 
at 250-251, 78 S.Ct, at 1237-1238. 
Moreover, this "trend . . . toward ex-
panding the permissible scope of state jur-
isdiction over foreign corporations and oth-
er nonresidents," McGee, supra, 355 U.S., 
at 222, 78 S.Ct, at 200, is entirely consist-
ent with the "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice," Internation-
al Shoe, 326 U.S., at 316, 66 S.Ct, at 158, 
that control our inquiry under the Due 
Process Clause. As active participants in 
interstate and foreign commerce take ad-
vantage of the economic benefits and op-
portunities offered by the various States, it 
is only fair and reasonable to subject them 
to the obligations that may be imposed by 
those jurisdictions. And chief among the 
obligations that a nonresident corporation 
should expect to fulfill is amenability to 
suit in any forum that is significantly af-
fected by the corporation's commercial ac-
tivities. 
As a foreign corporation that has active-
ly and purposefully engaged in numerous 
and frequent commercial transactions in 
the State of Texas, Helicol clearly falls 
within the* category of nonresident defend-
ants that may be subject to that forum's 
general jurisdiction. Helicol not only pur-
chased helicopters and other equipment in 
the State for many years, but also sent 
pilots and management personnel into Tex-
as to be trained in the use of this equip-
ment and to consult with the seller on 
technical matters.2 Moreover, negotiations 
for the ^ contract under which Helicol pro-
2. Although the Court takes note of these con-
tacts, it concludes that they did not Menhanc[e] 
the nature of Hellcol's contacts with Texas [be-
cause the] training was a part of the package of 
goods and services purchased by HelicoL" 
Ante, at 1874. Presumably, the Court's state-
ment simply recognizes that participation in to-
day's interdependent markets often necessitates 
the use of complicated purchase contracts that 
provide for numerous contacts between repre-
sentatives of the buyer and seller, as well as 
training for related personnel. Ironically, how-
ever, while relying on these modern-day reali-
ties to denigrate the significance of Heiicol's 
contacts with the forum, the Court refuses to 
acknowledge that these same realities require a 
vided transportation services to the joint 
venture that employed the respondents' de-
cedents also took place in the State of 
Texas. Taken together, these contacts 
demonstrate that Helicol obtained numer-
ous benefits from its transaction of busi-
ness in Texas. In turn, it is eminently fair 
and reasonable to expect Helicol to face the 
obligations that attach to its participation 
in such commercial transactions. Accord-
ingly, on the basis of continuous commer-
cial contacts with the forum, I would con-
clude that the Due Process Clause allows 
the State of Texas to assert general juris-
diction over petitioner Helicol. 
II 
The Court also fails to distinguish the 
legal principles that controlled our prior 
decisions in Perkins and Rosenberg. In 
particular, the contacts between petitioner 
Helicol and the State of Texas, unlike the 
contacts between the defendant and the 
forum in each of those cases, are signifi-
cantly related to the cause of action alleged 
in the original suit filed by the respondents. 
Accordingly, in my view, it is both fair and 
reasonable for the Texas courts to assert 
specific jurisdiction over Helicol in this 
case. 
By asserting that the present case does 
not implicate the specific jurisdiction of the 
Texas courts, see ante, at 1872-1873, and 
nn. 10 and 12, the Court necessarily re-
moves its decision i42sfrom the reality of 
the actual facts presented for our consider-
ation.* Moreover, the Court refuses to con-
concomitant expansion in a forum's jurisdic-
tional reach. See supra* at 1876-1877. As a 
result when deciding that the balance in this 
case must be struck against jurisdiction, the 
Court loses sight of the ultimate inquiry: wheth-
er it is fair and reasonable to subject a nonresi-
dent corporate defendant to the jurisdiction of a 
State when that defendant has purposefully 
availed itself of the benefits and obligations of 
that particular forum. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 US. 235,253,78 S.CL 1228, 1239,2 LE<L2d 
1283 (1958). 
3. Nor do I agree with the Court that the respon-
dents have conceded that their claims are not 
related to Heiicol's activities within the State of 
Texas. Although parts of their written and oral 
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aider any distinction between contacts that 
are "related to" the underlying cause of 
action and contacts that "give rise" to the 
underlying cause of action. In my view, 
however, there is a substantial difference 
between these two standards for asserting 
specific jurisdiction. Thus, although I 
agree that the respondents' cause of action 
did not formally "arise out o f specific 
activities initiated by Helicol in the State of 
Texas, I believe that the wrongful-death 
claim filed by the respondents is signifi-
cantly related to the undisputed contacts 
between Helicol and' the forum. On that 
basis, I would conclude that the Due Pro-
cess Clause allows the Texas courts to as-
sert specific jurisdiction over this particular 
action. 
The wrongful-death actions filed by the 
respondents were premised on a fatal heli-
copter crash that occurred in Peru. Helicol 
was joined as a defendant in the lawsuits 
because it provided transportation services, 
including the particular helicopter and pilot 
involved in the crash, to the joint venture 
Uathat employed the decedents. Specifical-
ly, the respondent Hall claimed in her origi-
nal complaint that "Helicol is . . . legally 
responsible for its own negligence through 
its pilot employee." App. 6a. Viewed in 
light of these allegations, the contacts be-
tween Helicol and the State of Texas are 
directly and significantly related to the un-
derlying claim filed by the respondents. 
The negotiations that took place in Texas 
led to the contract in which Helicol agreed 
arguments before the Court proceed on the as-
sumption that no such relationship exists, other 
portions suggest just the opposite: 
If it is the concern of the Solicitor General 
[appearing for the United States as amicus curi-
ae] that a holding for Respondents here will 
cause foreign companies to refrain from pur-
chasing in the United States for fear of exposure 
to general jurisdiction on unrelated causes of 
action, such concern is not well founded. 
"Respondents' cause is not dependent on a 
ruling that mere purchases in a state, together 
with incidental training for operating and main-
taining the iTTr>haru^<*> purchased <*si»* consti-
tute the ties, contacts and relations necessary to 
justify jurisdiction over an lmrclatrri cause of 
action. However, regular purchases and train-
ing coupled with other contacts, ties and reia-
to provide the precise transportation servic-
es that were being used at the time of the 
crash. Moreover, the helicopter involved in 
the crash was purchased by Helicol in Tex-
as, and the pilot whose negligence was 
alleged to have caused the crash was actu-
ally trained in Texas. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 
5, 22. This is simply not a case, therefore, 
in which a state court has asserted jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant on the 
basis of wholly unrelated contacts with the 
forum. Rather, the contacts between Heli-
col and the forum are directly related to 
the negligence that was alleged in the re-
spondent Hail's original complaint4 Be-
cause Helicol should have expected to be 
amenable to suit in the Texas courts for 
claims directly related to these contacts, it 
is fair and reasonable to allow the assertion 
of jurisdiction in this case. 
Despite this substantial relationship be-
tween the contacts and the cause of action, 
the Court declines to consider whether the 
courts of Texas may assert specific juris-
diction over this suit Apparently, tins sim-
ply reflects a narrow interpretation of the 
question presented for review. See ante, 
at 1873, IL 10. It is nonetheless possible 
that the Court's opinion may be read to 
imply that the specific jurisdiction of the 
Texas courts is inapplicable because the 
cause of action |^ gdid not formally "arise 
out o f the contacts between Helicol and 
the forum. In my view, however, such a 
rule would place unjustifiable limits on the 
uons may form the basis for jurisdiction.'' 
Brief for Respondents 13-14. 
Thus, while the respondents' position before this 
Court is admittedly less than clear. I believe it is 
preferable to address the specific jurisdiction of 
the Texas courts because Helicol's contacts with 
Texas are in fact related to the underlying cause 
of action. 
4. The jury specifically found that "the pilot 
failed to keep die helicopter under proper con-
trol," that "the helicopter was flown into a tree* 
top fog condition, whereby the vision of the 
pilot was impaired,1* that "such flying was negli-
gence," and that "such negligence . . . was a 
proximate cause of the crash." See App. 167a-
168a. On the basis of these findings, Hehcol 
was ordered to pay over $1 million in damages 
to the respondents, 
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under which Texas 
jurisdictional power.s 
Limiting the specific jurisdiction of a fo-
rum to cases in which the cause of action 
formally arose out of the defendant's con-
tacts with the State would subject constitu-
tional standards under the Due Process 
Clause to the vagaries of the substantive 
law or pleading requirements of each State. 
For example, the complaint filed against 
Helicol in this case alleged negligence 
based on pilot error. Even though the pilot 
was trained in Texas, the Court assumes 
that the Texas courts may not assert juris-
diction over the suit because the cause of 
action "did not 'arise out of/ and [is] not 
related to/' that training. See ante, at 
1872. If, however, the applicable substan-
tive law required that negligent training of 
the pilot was a necessary element of a 
cause of action for pilot error, or if the 
respondents had simply added an allegation 
of negligence in the training provided for 
the Helicol pilot, then presumably the 
Court would concede that the specific juris-
diction of the Texas courts was applicable. 
Our interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause has never been so dependent upon 
the applicable substantive law or the 
State's formal pleading requirements. At 
least since International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct 154, 90 
LEd. 95 (1945), the principal focus when 
determining whether a forum may constitu-
tionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant has been on fairness and 
reasonableness to the defendant, To this 
extent, a court's specific jurisdiction should 
be applicable whenever the cause of action 
arises out of or relates to the contacts 
between the defendant and the forum. It 
is enjnently<28 fair and reasonable, in my 
view, to subject a defendant to suit in a 
forum with which it has significant con-
tacts directly related to the underlying 
cause of action. Because Helicol's contacts 
with the State of Texas meet this standard, 
9L Compare Von Mehren & Trautman. Jurisdic-
tion to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HarvXJRev. 1121, 1144-1163 (1966). with Ml-
mayer. How Contacts Count: Due Process Limi-
PALMORE v. SIDOTI 
Cite as 104 SXL 1879 (1984) 
may assert its I would affirm the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Texas. 
(O |KEYNUM«ISYmM> 
466 VS. 429, 80 I_EcUd 421 
jjpLinda Sidoti PALMORE, Petitioner 
v. 
Anthony J. SIDOTI. 
No. 82-1734. 
Argued Feb. 22, 1984. 
Decided April 25, 1984. 
Father sought custody of parties' 
daughter by filing petition to modify prior 
judgment because of changed conditions, 
namely, that mother was then cohabiting 
with a Negro, whom she later married. 
The Florida trial court awarded custody to 
father, concluding that child's best inter-
ests would be served thereby, and mother 
appealed. The Florida District Court of 
Appeal, 426 So.2d 34, affirmed, and certio-
rari was granted. The Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Burger, held that reality of 
private biases and possible injury they 
might inflict were impermissible considera-
tions under equal protection clause for di-
vesting natural mother of custody of her 
infant child because of her remarriage to 
person of different race. 
Reversed. 
Opinion after remand, 472 So.2d 843. 
1. Constitutional Law *=»215 
Racial classifications are subject to 
most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitu-
tional muster, they must be justified by 
compelling governmental interests and 
must be necessary to accomplishment of its 
tattoos on State Court Jurisdiction. 1930 S.CL 
Rev. 77.80-**. See also Lilly. Jurisdiction Over 
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VaXJLev. 
S5„ 100-101. and n. 66 (1983). 
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KULKO v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA IN AND 
FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
(HORN, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) 
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
No. 77-293. Argued March 29, 1978—Decided May 15, 1978 
Appellant and appellee, both then New York doraiciliaries, were married 
in 1959 in California during appellant's three-day stopover while he was 
en route to overseas military duty. After the marriage, appellee 
returned to New York, as did appellant following his tour of duty and a 
24-hour stopover in California. In 1961 and 1962 a son and daughter 
were born to them in New York, where the family resided together until 
March 1972, when appellant and appellee separated. Appellee then 
moved to California. Under a separation agreement, executed by both 
parties in New York, the children were to remain with appellant father 
during the school year but during specified vacations with appellee 
mother, whom appellant agreed to pay 13,000 per year in child support 
for the periods when the children were in her custody. Appellee, after 
obtaining a divorce in Haiti, which incorporated the terms of the 
separation agreement, returned to California. In December 1973 the 
daughter at her request and with her father's consent joined her mother 
in California, and remained there during the school year, spending vaca-
tions with her father. Appellee, without appellant's consent, arranged 
for the son to join her in California about two years later. Appellee 
then brought this action against appellant in California to establish the 
Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, to modify the judgment 
so as to award her full custody of the children, and to increase appellant's 
child-support obligations. Appellant, resisting the claim for increased 
support, appeared specially, claiming that he lacked sufficient "minimum 
contacts" with that State under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U. S. 310, 316, to warrant the State's assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over him. The California Supreme Court, upholding lower-court 
determinations adverse to appellant, concluded that where a nonresident 
defendant has caused an "effect" in the State by an act or omission 
outside the State, personal jurisdiction over the defendant arising from 
the effect may be exercised whenever "reasonable," and that such exercise 
was "reasonable" here because appellant had "purposely availed himself 
of the benefits and protections of California" by sending the daughter to 
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live with her mother there, and that it was "fair and reasonable" for the 
defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction for the support of 
both children. Held: The exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the 
California courts over appellant, a New York domiciliary, would violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere act 
of sending a child to California to live with her mother connotes no 
intent to obtain nor expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in 
that State that would make fair the assertion of that State's judicial 
jurisdiction over appellant. Pp. 91-101. 
(a) A defendant to be bound by a judgment against him must "have 
certain minimum contacts with [the forum State] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice/ " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 
at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463. P. 92. 
(b) The acquiescence of appellant in his daughter's desire to live with 
her mother in California was not enough to confer jurisdiction over 
appellant in the California courts. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S 
186, 216. P. 94. 
(c) Exercise of in personam jurisdiction over appellant was not 
warranted by the financial benefit appellant derived from his daughter's 
presence in California for nine months of the year, since any diminution 
in appellant's household costs resulted not from the child's presence in 
California but from her absence from appellant's home, and from 
appellee's failure to seek an increase in support payments in New York. 
Pp. 94-96. 
(d) The "effects" rule that the California courts applied is intended 
to reach wrongful activity outside of the forum State causing injury 
within the State where such application would not be "unreasonable," 
but here, where there is no claim that appellant visited physical injury 
on either property or persons in California; where the cause of action 
arises from appellant's personal, domestic relations; and where the 
controversy arises from a separation that occurred in New York, and 
modification is sought of a contract negotiated and signed in New York 
that had virtually no connection with the forum State, it is "unreason-
able" for California to assert personal jurisdiction over appellant. 
Pp. 96-97. 
(e) Since appellant remained in the State of marital domicile and did 
no more than acquiesce in the stated preference of his daughter to live 
with her mother in California, basic considerations of fairness point 
decisively to appellant's State of domicile as the proper forum for 
adjudicating this case, whatever be the merits of appellee's underlying 
claim. Pp. 97-98. 
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(f) California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children 
residing in California without unduly disrupting the children's lives is 
already being served by the State's participation in the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968, which permits a 
California resident claiming support from a nonresident to file a petition 
in California and have its merits adjudicated in the State of the alleged 
obligor's residence, without either party's having to leave his or her own 
State. New York is a signatory to a similar statute. Those statutes 
appear to provide appellee with means to vindicate her claimed right to 
additional child support from appellant and collection of any support 
payments found to be owed to her by appellant. Pp. 98-101. 
Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted; 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P. 2d 353, 
reversed. 
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, 
C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. 
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and POWELL, JJ., 
joined, post, p. 101. 
' Lawrence H. Stotter argued the cause for appellant. With 
him on the brief was Edward Schaefler. 
Suzie S. Thorn argued the cause for appellee. With her on 
the brief was James E. Sutherland. 
MR. JUBTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue before us is whether, in this action for child sup-
port, the California state courts may exercise in personam 
jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor 
children domiciled within the State. For reasons set forth 
below, we hold that the exercise of such jurisdiction would 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
Appellant Ezra Kulko married appellee Sharon Kulko Horn 
in 1959, during appellant's three-day stopover in California 
en route from a military base in Texas to a tour of duty in 
Korea. At the time of this marriage, both parties were domi-
ciled in and residents of New York State. Immediately fol-
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lowing the marriage, Sharon Kulko returned to New York, as 
did appellant after his tour of duty. Their first child, Darwin, 
was born to the Kulkos in New York in 1961, and a year later 
their second child, Ilsa, was born, also in New York. The 
Kulkos and their two children resided together as a family in 
New York City continuously until March 1972, when the 
Kulkos separated. 
Following the separation, Sharon Kulko moved to San 
Francisco, Cal. A written separation agreement was drawn 
up in New York; in September 1972, Sharon Kulko flew 
to New York City in order to sign this agreement. The agree-
ment provided, inter alia, that the children would remain with 
their father during the school year but would spend their 
Christmas, Easter, and summer vacations with their mother. 
While Sharon Kulko waived any claim for her own support 
or maintenance, Ezra Kulko agreed to pay his wife $3,000 per 
year in child support for the periods when the children 
were in her care, custody, and control. Immediately after 
execution of the separation agreement, Sharon Kulko flew to 
Haiti and procured a divorce there;* the divorce decree incor-
porated the terms of the agreement. She then returned 
to California, where she remarried and took the name Horn. 
The children resided with appellant during the school year 
and with their mother on vacations, as provided by the sepa-
ration agreement, until December 1973. At this time, just 
before Ilsa was to leave New York to spend Christmas vacation 
with her mother, she told her father that she wanted to re-
main in California after her vacation. Appellant bought his 
daughter a one-way plane ticket, and Ilsa left, taking her 
1
 While the Jurisdictional Statement, at 5, asserts that "the parties" flew 
to Haiti, appellant's affidavit submitted in the Superior Court stated that 
Sharon Kulko flew to Haiti with a power of attorney signed by appellant. 
App. 28. The Haitian decree states that Sharon Kulko appeared "in 
person" and that appellant filed a "Power of Attorney and submission to 
jurisdiction." Id., at 14. 
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clothing with her. Ilsa then commenced living in California 
with her mother during the school year and spending vacations 
with her father. In January 1976, appellant's other child, 
Darwin, called his mother from New York and advised her 
that he wanted to live with her in California. Unbeknownst 
to appellant, appellee Horn sent a plane ticket to her son, 
which he used to fly to California where he took up residence 
with his mother and sister. 
Less than one month after Darwin's arrival in California, 
appellee Horn commenced this action against appellant in the 
California Superior Court. She sought to establish the 
Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment; to modify 
the judgment so as to award her full custody of the children; 
and to increase appellant's child-support obligations.* Appel-
lant appeared specially and moved to quash service of the 
summons on the ground that he was not a resident of Califor-
nia and lacked sufficient "minimum contacts" with the State 
under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310,316 
(1945), to warrant the State's assertion of personal jurisdiction 
over him. 
The trial court summarily denied the motion to quash, and 
appellant sought review in the California Court of Appeal by 
petition for a writ of mandate. Appellant did not contest the 
court's jurisdiction for purposes of the custody determination, 
but, with respect to the claim for increased support, he re-
newed his argument that the California courts lacked personal 
jurisdiction over him. The appellate court affirmed the denial 
of appellant's motion to quash, reasoning that, by consenting 
to his children's living in California, appellant had "caused 
2
 Appellee Horn's complaint also sought an order restraining appellant 
from removing his children from the State. The trial court immediately 
granted appellee temporary custody of the children and restrained both her 
and appellant from removing the children from the State of California. 
See 19 Cal. 3d 514, 520, 564 P. 2d 353, 355 (1977). The record does not 
reflect whether appellant is still enjoined from removing his children from 
the State. 
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an effect in th [e] state" warranting the exercise of jurisdiction 
over him. 133 Cal. Rptr. 627,628 (1976). 
The California Supreme Court granted appellant's petition 
for review, and in a 4-2 decision sustained the rulings of the 
lower state courts. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P. 2d 353 (1977). It 
noted first that the California Code of Civil Procedure demon-
strated an intent that the courts of California utilize all bases 
of in personam jurisdiction "not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution." * Agreeing with the court below, the Supreme 
Court stated that, where a nonresident defendant has caused 
an effect in the State by an act or omission outside the State, 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in causes arising from 
that effect may be exercised whenever "reasonable." Id., 
at 521, 564 P. 2d, at 356. It went on to hold that siich an 
exercise was "reasonable" in this case because appellant had 
"purposely availed himself of the benefits and protections of 
the laws of California" by sending Ilsa to live with her mother 
in California. Id., at 521-522, 524, 564 P. 2d, at 356, 358. 
While noting that appellant had not, "with respect to his other 
child, Darwin, caused an effect in [California] "—since it was 
appellee Horn who had arranged for Darwin to fly to Califor-
nia in January 1976—the court concluded that it was "fair and 
reasonable for defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction 
for the support of both children, where he has committed acts 
with respect to one child which confers [sic] personal jurisdic-
tion and has consented to the permanent residence of the other 
child in California." Id., at 525, 564 P. 2d, at 358-359. 
In the view of the two dissenting justices, permitting a 
minor child to move to California could not be regarded as a 
•Section 410.10, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. (West 1973), provides: 
"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not incon-
sistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." 
The opinion below does not appear to distinguish between the requirements 
of the Federal and State Constitutions. See 19 Cal. 3d, at 521-522, 564 
P. 2d, at 356. 
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purposeful act by which appellant had invoked the benefits 
and protection of state law. Since appellant had been in the 
State of California on only two brief occasions many years 
before on military stopovers, and lacked any other contact with 
the State, the dissenting opinion argued that appellant could 
not reasonably be subjected to the in personam jurisdiction of 
the California state courts. Id., at 526-529, 564 P. 2d, at 
359-360. 
On Ezra Kulko's appeal to this Court, probable jurisdiction 
was postponed. 434 U. S. 983 (1977). We have concluded 
that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie,4 but, treating the 
papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, we hereby grant 
the petition and reverse the judgment below.8 
4
 As was true in both Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 (1958), and 
May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 (1953), this case was improperly brought 
to this Court as an appeal, since no state statute was "drawn in ques-
tion . . . on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties 
or laws of the United States," 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). The jurisdictional 
statute construed by the California Supreme Court provides that the 
State's jurisdiction is as broad as the Constitution permits. See n. 3, 
supra. Appellant did not argue below that this statute was unconstitu-
tional, but instead argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment precluded the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over him. 
The opinion below does not purport to determine the constitutionality of 
the California jurisdictional statute. Rather, the question decided was 
whether the Constitution itself would permit the assertion of jurisdiction. 
Appellant requested that, in the event that appellate jurisdiction under 
28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) was found lacking, the papers be acted upon as a 
petition for certiorari pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2103. We follow the 
practice of both Hanson and May in deeming the papers to be a petition 
for a writ of certiorari. As in Hanson and May, moreover, we shall 
continue to refer to the parties herein as appellant and appellee to 
minimize confusion. See 357 U. S., at 244; 345 U. S., at 530. 
8
 After the California Supreme Court's decision, appellant sought a 
continuance of trial-court proceedings pending this Court's disposition of 
his appeal. Appellant's request for a continuance was denied by the trial 
court, and subsequently that court determined that appellant was in 
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II 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to 
enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident 
defendants. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 198-200 
(1977). It has long been the rule that a valid judgment 
imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff 
may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the 
person of the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 XJ. S. 714, 
732-733 (1878); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U. S., at 316. The existence of personal jurisdiction, in 
turn, depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the 
defendant that an action has been brought, Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313-314 (1950), and a 
sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum 
State to make it fair to require defense of the action in the 
forum. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463-464 (1940). 
In this case, appellant does not dispute the adequacy of the 
notice that he received, but contends that his connection with 
the State of California is too attenuated, under the standards 
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, to 
justify imposing upon him the burden and inconvenience of 
defense in California. 
arrears on bis child-support payments. App. to Brief for Appellant ii-iii. 
In light of the change in custody arrangements, the court also ordered 
that appellant's child-support obligations be increased substantially. Ibid. 
Appellee Horn argues that appellant's request for a continuance 
amounted to a general appearance and a waiver of jurisdictional objec-
tions, and that accordingly there b no longer a live controversy as to the 
jurisdictional issue before us. Appellee's argument concerning the juris-
dictional effect of a motion for a continuance, however, does not find 
support in the California statutes, rules, or cases that she cites. Moreover, 
the state trial court expressly determined, subsequent to the request for a 
continuance, that appellant had "made a special appearance only to 
contest the jurisdiction of the Court." Id., at i. Under these circum-
stances, appellant's challenge to the state court's ro personam jurisdiction 
is not moot. 
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The parties are in agreement that the constitutional stand-
ard for determining whether the State may enter a binding 
judgment against appellant here is that set forth in this 
Courts opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
supra: that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts with 
[the forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice/ " 326 U. S., at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, supra, 
at 463. While the interests of the forum State and of the 
plaintiff in proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff's forum 
of choice are, of course, to be considered, see McOee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220, 223 (1957), an essential 
criterion in all cases is whether the "quality and nature" of 
the defendant's activity is such that it is "reasonable" and 
"fair" to require him to conduct his defense in that State. 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 316-317, 319. 
Accord, Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 207-212; Perkins v. Ben-
guet Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437,445 (1952). 
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reason-
ableness," the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe 
is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts 
of each case must be weighed to determine whether the 
requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present. Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 246 (1958). We recognize that this 
determination is one in which few answers will be written "in 
black and white. The greys are dominant and even among 
them the shades are innumerable." Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 
541, 545 (1948). But we believe that the California Supreme 
Court's application of the minimum-contacts test in this case 
represents an unwarranted extension of International Shoe 
and would, if sustained, sanction a result that is neither fair, 
just, nor reasonable. 
A 
In reaching its result, the California Supreme Court did not 
rely on appellant's glancing presence in the State some 13 
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years before the events that led to this controversy, nor could 
it have. Appellant has been in California on only two occa-
sions, once in 1959 for a three-day military stopover on his 
way to Korea, see supra, at 86-87, and again in 1960 for a 
24-hour stopover on his return from Korean service. To hold 
such temporary visits to a State a basis for the assertion of in 
personam jurisdiction over unrelated actions arising in the 
future would make a mockery of the limitations on state 
jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor did 
the California court rely on the fact that appellant was actually 
married in California on one of his two brief visits. We agree 
that where two New York domiciliaries, for reasons of con-
venience, marry in the State of California and thereafter 
spend their entire married life in New York, the fact of their 
California marriage by itself cannot support a California 
court's exercise of jurisdiction over a spouse who remains a 
New York resident in an action relating to child support. 
Finally, in holding that personal jurisdiction existed, the 
court below carefully disclaimed reliance on the fact that 
appellant had agreed at the time of separation to allow his 
children to live with their mother three months a year and 
that he had sent them to California each year pursuant to this 
agreement. As was noted below, 19 Cal. 3d, at 523-524, 564 
P. 2d, at 357, to find personal jurisdiction in a State on this 
basis, merely because the mother was residing there, would 
discourage parents from entering into reasonable visitation 
agreements. Moreover, it could arbitrarily subject one parent 
to Buit in any State of the Union where the other parent chose 
to spend time while having custody of their offspring pursuant 
to a separation agreement.8 As we have emphasized: 
"The unilateral activity of those who claim some rela-
• Although the separation agreement stated that appellee Horn resided in 
California and provided that child-support payments would be mailed to 
her California address, it also specifically contemplated that appellee might 
move to a different State. The agreement directed appellant to mail the 
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tionship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the 
requirement of contact with the forum State. . . . [ I ] t 
is essential in each case that there be some act by which 
the defendant purposefully avails fhim]self of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . . " 
Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at 253. 
The "purposeful act" that the California Supreme Court 
believed did warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
appellant in California was his "actively and fully consent[ing] 
to Ilsa living in California for the school year . . . and . . . 
8en[ding] her to California for that purpose." 19 Cal. 3d, at 
524, 564 P. 2d, at 358. We cannot accept the proposition that 
appellant's acquiescence in Ilsa's desire to live with her mother 
conferred jurisdiction over appellant in the California courts 
in this action. A father who agrees, in the interests of family 
harmony and his children's preferences, to allow them to spend 
more time in California than was required under a separation 
agreement can hardly be said to have "purposefully availed 
himself" of the "benefits and protections" of California's laws. 
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S., at 216/ 
Nor can we agree with the assertion of the court below that 
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction here was warranted by 
the financial benefit appellant derived from his daughter's 
presence in California for nine months of the year. 19 Cal. 
3d, at 524-525, 564 P. 2d, at 358. This argument rests on the 
premise that, while appellant's liability for support payments 
support payments to appellee's San Francisco address or "any other 
address which the Wife may designate from time to time in writing." 
App. 10. 
7
 The court below stated that the presence in California of appellant's 
daughter gave appellant the benefit of California's "police and fire protec-
tion, its school system, its hospital services, its recreational facilities, ita 
libraries nnd museums . . . ." 19 Cal. 3d, at 522, 564 P. 2d, at 356. But, 
in the circumstances presented here, these services provided by the State 
were essentially benefits to the child, not the father, and in any event were 
not benefits that appellant purposefully sought for himself. 
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remained unchanged, his yearly expenses for supporting the 
child in New York decreased. But this circumstance, even if 
true, does not support California's assertion of jurisdiction 
here. Any diminution in appellant's household costs resulted, 
not from the child's presence in California, but rather from 
her absence from appellant's home. Moreover, an action by 
appellee Horn to increase support payments could now be 
brought, and could have been brought when Ilsa first moved 
to California, in the State of New York; • a New York court 
would clearly have personal jurisdiction over appellant and, if 
a judgment were entered by a New York court increasing 
appellant's child-support obligations, it could properly be 
enforced against him in both New York and California.* Any 
ultimate financial advantage to appellant thus results not from 
the child's presence in California, but from appellee's failure 
earlier to seek an increase in payments under the separation 
agreement.10 The argument below to the contrary, in our 
• Under the separation agreement, appellant is bound to "indemnify and 
hold [his] Wife harmless from any and all attorney fees, costs and 
expenses which she may incur by reason of the default of [appellant] in 
the performance of any of the obligations required to be performed by him 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of this agreement." App. 11. To 
the extent that appellee Horn seeks arrearages, see n. 5, supra, her 
litigation expenses, presumably including any additional costs incurred by 
her as a result of having to prosecute the action in New York, would 
thus be borne by appellant. 
• A final judgment entered by a New York court having jurisdiction over 
the defendant's person and over the subject matter of the lawsuit would be 
entitled to full faith and credit in any State. See New York ex rel. 
Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 614 (1947). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U.S.393, 407 (1975). 
10
 It may well be that, as a matter of state law, appellee Horn could still 
obtain through New York proceedings additional payments from appellant 
for Ilsa's support from January 1974, when a de facto modification of the 
custody provisions of the separation agreement took place, until the 
present. See H. Clark, Domestic Relations § 15.2, p. 500 (1968); cf. In re 
Santa Clara County v. Hughes, 43 Misc. 2d 559,251 N. Y. S. 2d 579 (1964). 
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view, confuses the question of appellant's liability with that 
of the proper forum in which to determine that liability. 
B 
In light of our conclusion that appellant did not purpose-
fully derive benefit from any activities relating to the State of 
California, it is apparent that the California Supreme Court's 
reliance on appellant's having caused an "effect" in California 
was misplaced. See supra, at 89. This "effects" test is 
derived from the American Law Institute's Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws § 37 (1971), which provides: 
"A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an 
individual who causes effects in the state by an act done 
elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from 
these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the 
individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of 
such jurisdiction unreasonable."1X 
While this provision is not binding on this Court, it does not 
in any event support the decision below. As is apparent from 
the examples accompanying § 37 in the Restatement, this sec-
tion was intended to reach wrongful activity outside of the 
State causing injury within the State, see, e. g., Comment a, 
p. 157 (shooting bullet from one State into another), or 
commercial activity affecting state residents, ibid. Even in 
such situations, moreover, the Restatement recognizes that 
there might be circumstances that would render "unrea-
sonable" the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident 
defendant. 
The circumstances in this case clearly render "unreasonable" 
California's assertion of personal jurisdiction. There is no 
claim that appellant has visited physical injury on either 
11
 Section 37 of the Restatement has effectively been incorporated into 
California law. See Judicial Council Comment (9) to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
Ann. §410.10 (West 1973). 
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property or persons within the State of California. Cf. Hess 
v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). The cause of action 
herein asserted arises, not from the defendant's commercial 
transactions in interstate commerce, but rather from his 
personal, domestic relations. It thus cannot be said that 
appellant has sought a commercial benefit from solicitation 
of business from a resident of California that could rea-
sonably render him liable to suit in state court; appellant's 
activities cannot fairly be analogized to an insurer's sending 
an insurance contract and premium notices into the State 
to an insured resident of the State. Cf. McGee v. Inter-
national Life Insurance Co., 355 U. S. 220 (1957). Further-
more, the controversy between the parties arises from a separa-
tion that occurred in the State of New York; appellee Horn 
seeks modification of a contract that was negotiated in New 
York and that she flew to New York to sign. As in Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U. S., at 252, the instant action involves an 
agreement that was entered into with virtually no connection 
with the forum State. See also n. 6, supra. 
Finally, basic considerations of fairness point decisively in 
favor of appellant's State of domicile as the proper forum for 
adjudication of this case, whatever the merits of appellee's 
underlying claim. It is appellant who has remained in the 
State of the marital domicile, whereas it is appellee who has 
moved across the continent. Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 
528, 534-535, n. 8 (1953). Appellant has at all times resided 
in New York State, and, until the separation and appellee's 
move to California, his entire family resided there as well. As 
noted above, appellant did no more than acquiesce in the 
stated preference of one of his children to live with her mother 
in California. This single act is surely not one that a reason-
able parent would expect to result in the substantial financial 
burden and personal strain of litigating a child-support suit in 
a forum 3,000 miles away, and we therefore see no basis on 
which it can be said that appellant could reasonably have 
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anticipated being "haled before a [California] court," Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U. S., at 216." To make jurisdiction in a case 
such as this turn on whether appellant bought his daughter 
her ticket or instead unsuccessfully sought to prevent her 
departure would impose an unreasonable burden on family 
relations, and one wholly unjustified by the "quality and 
nature" of appellant's activities in or relating to the State of 
California. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S., 
at 319. 
I l l 
In seeking to justify the burden that would be imposed on 
appellant were the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in 
California sustained, appellee argues that California has sub-
stantial interests in protecting the welfare of its minor resi-
dents and in promoting to the fullest extent possible a healthy 
and supportive family environment in which the children of 
the State are to be raised. These interests are unquestionably 
important. But while the presence of the children and one 
parent in California arguably might favor application of Cali-
fornia law in a lawsuit in New York, the fact that California 
may be the " 'center of gravity*" for choice-of-law purposes 
does not mean that California has personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant. Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at 254. And Cali-
fornia has not attempted to assert any particularized interest 
in trying such cases in its courts by, e. g., enacting a special 
jurisdictional statute. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. 
Co., supra, at 221, 224. 
California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of 
children resident in California without unduly disrupting the 
children's lives, moreover, is already being served by the State's 
participation in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act of 1968. This statute provides a mechanism 
,fSee also Developments in the Law—State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 909, 911 (1960). 
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for communication between court systems in different States, 
in order to facilitate the procurement and enforcement of 
child-support decrees where the dependent children reside in a 
State that cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant. California's version of the Act essentially permits a 
California resident claiming support from a nonresident to file 
a petition in California and have its merits adjudicated in the 
State of the alleged obligor's residence, without either party's 
having to leave his or her own State. Cal. Civ. Proo. Code 
Ann. § 1650 et seq. (West 1972 and Supp. 1978)." New York 
State is a signatory to a similar Act." Thus, not only may 
"In addition to California, 24 other States are signatories to this Act. 
9 U. L. A. 473 (Supp. 1978). Under the Act, an "obligee" may file a 
petition in a court of his or her State (the "initiating court") to obtain 
support. 9 U. L. A. §§11, 14 (1973). If the court "finds that the 
[petition] sets forth facts from which it may be determined that the 
obligor owes a duty of support and that a court of the responding state 
may obtain jurisdiction of the obligor or his property," it may send a copy 
of the petition to the "responding state." § 14. This has the effect of 
requesting the responding State "to obtain jurisdiction over the obligor." 
§ 18 (b). If jurisdiction is obtained, then a hearing is set in a court in the 
responding State at which the obligor may, if he chooses, contest the claim. 
The claim may be litigated in that court, with deposition testimony 
submitted through the initiating court by the initiating spouse or other 
party. § 20. If the responding state court finds that the obligor owes a 
duty of support pursuant to the laws of the State where he or she was 
present during the time when support was sought, § 7, judgment for the 
petitioner is entered. § 24. If the money is collected from the spouse in 
the responding State, it is then sent to the court in the initiating State for 
distribution to the initiating party. § 28. 
14
 While not a signatory to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act of 1968, New York is a party to the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act of 1950, as amended. N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
§ 30 et seq. (McKinney 1977) (Uniform Support of Dependents Law). By 
1957 this Act, or its substantial equivalent, had been enacted in all States, 
organized Territories, and the District of Columbia. 9 U. L. A. 885 
(1973). The "two-state" procedure in the 1950 Act for obtaining and 
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plaintiff-appellee here vindicate her claimed right to additional 
child support from her former husband in a New York court, 
see supra, at 95, but also the Uniform Acts will facilitate 
both her prosecution of a claim for additional support and col-
lection of any support payments found to be owed by 
appellant." 
It cannot be disputed that California has substantial 
interests in protecting resident children and in facilitating 
child-support actions on behalf of those children. But these 
interests simply do not make California a "fair forum," 
Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 215, in which to require ap-
pellant, who derives no personal or commercial benefit from 
his child's presence in California and who lacks any other 
enforcing support obligations owed by a spouse in one State to a spouse 
in another is similar to (hat provided in the 1968 Act. See n. 13, supra. 
See generally Note, 48 Cornell L. Q. 541 (1963). 
In Landes v. Landes, 1 N. Y. 2d 358, 135 N. E. 2d 562, appeal dis-
missed, 352 U. S. 948 (1956), the court upheld a support decree entered 
against a divorced husband living in New York, on a petition filed by his 
former wife in California pursuant to the Uniform Act. No prior support 
agreement or decree existed between the parties; the California spouse 
sought support from the New York husband for the couple's minor child, 
who was residing with her mother in California. The New York Court of 
Appeals concluded that the procedures followed—filing of a petition in 
California, followed by its certification to New York's Family Court, the 
obtaining of jurisdiction over the husband, a hearing in New York on the 
merits of the petition, and entry of an award—were proper under the laws 
of both States and were constitutional. The constitutionality of these pro-
cedures has also been upheld in other jurisdictions. See, e. g., Watson v. 
Dreadin, 309 A. 2d 493 (DC 1973), cert, denied, 415 U. S. 959 (1974); 
State ex rel. Terry v. Terry, 80 N. M. 185, 453 P. 2d 206 (1969); Harmon 
v. Harmon, 184 Cal. App. 2d 245, 7 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960), appeal dis-
missed and cert, denied, 366 U. S. 270 (1961). 
15
 Thus, it cannot here be concluded, as it was in McGee v. International 
Life Insurance Co., 355 U. S. 220,223-224 (1957), with respect to actions on 
insurance contracts, that resident plaintiffs would be at a "severe disad-
vantage" if in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants were 
sometimes unavailable. 
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relevant contact with the State, either to defend a child-
support suit or to suffer liability by default. 
IV 
We therefore believe that the state courts in the instant case 
failed to heed our admonition that "the flexible standard of 
International Shoe" does not "heraltd] the eventual demise 
of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts/' 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S., at 251. In McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., we commented on the extension of in 
personam jurisdiction under evolving standards of due proc-
ess, explaining that this trend was in large part "attributable 
to the . . . increasing nationalization of commerce . . . [accom-
panied by] modern transportation and communication [that] 
have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend 
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity." 
355 U. S., at 222-223. But the mere act of sending a child to 
California to live with her mother is not a commercial act and 
connotes no intent to obtain or expectancy of receiving a cor-
responding benefit in the State that would make fair the asser-
tion of that State's judicial jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant's motion to 
quash service, on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction, 
was erroneously denied by the California courts. The judg-
ment of the California Supreme Court is, therefore, 
Reversed. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE 
and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting. 
The Court properly treats this case as presenting a single 
narrow question. That question is whether the California 
Supreme Court correctly "weighed" "the facts," ante, at 92, of 
this particular case in applying the settled "constitutional 
standard," ibid., that before state courts may exercise in 
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personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary par-
ent of minor children domiciled in the State, it must appear 
that the nonresident has "certain minimum contacts [with the 
forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice/ " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 
316 (1945). The Court recognizes that "this determination is 
one in which few answers will be written 'in blade and white/ " 
ante, at 92. I cannot say that the Court's determination 
against state-court in personam jurisdiction is implausible, 
but, though the issue is close, my independent weighing of the 
facts leads me to conclude, in agreement with the analysis and 
determination of the California Supreme Court, that appel-
lant's connection with the State of California was not too 
attenuated, under the standards of reasonableness and fair-
ness implicit in the Due Process Clause, to require him to 
conduct his defense in the California courts. I therefore 
dissent. 
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. 
SLOAN 
CERTIORARI. TO T H E UNITED 8TATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
No. 75-1607. Argued March 27-28, 1978—Decided May 15, 1978 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) has the authority 
under § 12 (k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act) "summarily 
to suspend trading in any security . . . for a period not exceeding ten 
days" if "in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors 
so require." Acting pursuant to § 12 (k) and its predecessor, the Com-
mission issued a series of summary 10-day orders continuously suspend-
ing trading in the common stock of a certain corporation for over a year. 
Respondent, who owned 13 shares of the stock and who had engaged 
in substantial purchases and 6hort sales of shares of the stock, filed a 
petition pursuant to the Act in the Court of Appeals for n review of the 
orders, contending, inter alia, that the "tacking" of the 10-day summary 
suspension orders exceeded the Commission's authority under § 12 (k). 
Because shortly after the suit was brought no suspension order remained 
in effect and the Commission asserted that it had no plans to issue such 
orders in the foreseeable future, the Commission claimed that the case 
was moot. The court rejected that claim and upheld respondent's posi-
tion on the merits. In this Court, the Commission contends that the 
facts on the record are inadequate to allow a proper resolution of the 
mootness issue and that in any event it has the authority to issue con-
secutive 10-day sum man' suspension orders. Held: 
1. The case is not moot, since it is "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review," Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515. 
Effective judicial review is precluded during the life of the orders because 
a series of consecutive suspension orders may last no more than 20 days. 
In view of the numerous violations ascribed to the corporation involved, 
there is a reasonable probability that its stock will again be subjected 
to consecutive summary suspension orders; thus, there is a "reason-
able expectation that the same complaining party" will be subjected to 
the same action again. Cf. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147. Pp. 
108-110. 
2. The Commission does not have the authority under § 12 (k), based 
upon a single set of circumstances, to issue a series of summary orders 
that would suspend trading in a stock beyond the initial 10-day period, 
